Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations

Bergin, James; Lipman, Barton L.

doi:10.2307/2171851

Cited by 203 publications

(166 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…However, the analysis in those papers is devoted to issues in cooperative game theory such as the characterization of value allocations (see also, Myerson [32]). 5 5 See Dutta and Jackson [9] for an overview of the network formation literature.…”

Section: The Closely Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks

Jackson¹,

Watts²

2002

Journal of Economic Theory

833

755

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We examine the dynamic formation and stochastic evolution of networks connecting individuals. The payoff to an individual from an economic or social activity depends on the network of connections among individuals. Over time individuals form and sever links connecting themselves to other individuals based on the improvement that the resulting network offers them relative to the current network. In addition to intended changes in the network there is a small probability of unintended changes or errors. Predictions can be made regarding the likelihood that the stochastic process will lead to any given network at some time, where the stochastic process selects from among the statically stable networks and cycles. We apply these results to examples including the Gale-Shapley marriage problem. Thus the paper achieves two goals. First, it outlines a dynamic solution concept for networks. Second, it applies this concept to matching problems. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: A14, D20, J00. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)

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Section: The Closely Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…9 Thus 9 The probability of a mutation is the same for any link. See Bergin and Lipman [5] for a discussion of the role of such an assumption. mutations or trembles operate on link creation and destruction.…”

Section: A Stochastic Dynamic Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks

Jackson¹,

Watts²

2002

Journal of Economic Theory

833

755

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“…One of the early criticisms on the literature, due to Bergin and Lipman (1996), was that results might change if the perturbations (mistakes or mutations) which are used to define stochastic stability can be defined in a state-dependent way. By specifying arbitrary asymmetric perturbations it is possible to stabilize any outcome.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robust stochastic stability

Alós–Ferrer

Netzer

2014

Econ Theory

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may Revised Version January 2014Abstract A strategy profile of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius-coradius result for robust stochastic stability and examine several applications. For the logit-response dynamics, the selection of potential maximizers is robust for the subclass of supermodular symmetric binary-action games. For the mistakes model, the weaker property of strategic complementarity suffices for robustness in this class of games. We also investigate the robustness of the selection of risk-dominant strategies in coordination games under best-reply and the selection of Walrasian strategies in aggregative games under imitation.

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“…Evolutionary game theory demonstrates that the exact nature of such individual-level deviations can crucially influence equilibrium selection (Kandori et al, 1993;Young, 1993Young, , 1998Young, , 2011aKandori and Rob, 1995;Blume, 2003;Montaneri and Saberi, 2010;Sandholm, 2010;Newton, 2012a;Bergin and Lipman, 1996). In this paper, we therefore tested competing assumptions regarding the nature of deviations, analyzing data from a laboratory experiment on coordination games played in fixed networks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Behavioral Study of 'Noise' in Coordination Games

Maes

Nax

2014

SSRN Journal

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Abstract'Noise' in this study, in the sense of evolutionary game theory, refers to deviations from prevailing behavioral rules. Analyzing data from a laboratory experiment on coordination in networks, we tested 'what kind of noise' is supported by behavioral evidence. This empirical analysis complements a growing theoretical literature on 'how noise matters' for equilibrium selection. We find that the vast majority of decisions (96%) constitute myopic best responses, but deviations continue to occur with probabilities that are sensitive to their costs, that is, less frequent when implying larger payoff losses relative to the myopic best response. In addition, deviation rates vary with patterns of realized payoffs that are related to trial-and-error behavior. While there is little evidence that deviations are clustered in time or space, there is evidence of individual heterogeneity.

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Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations

Cited by 203 publications

References 12 publications

The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks

The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks

Robust stochastic stability

A Behavioral Study of 'Noise' in Coordination Games

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