Evidence on Electoral Accountability in the U.S. Senate: Are Unfaithful Agents Really Punished?

Abstract

Many have questioned whether voters are able to hold incumbent officials electorally accountable through a retrospective voting strategy. We examine U.S. Senate elections from 1962 to 2 990 in fbrty-one states, explaining which incumbents ran fbr reelection and their success in seeking reelection. We find that an incumbent's deviation from her state party plaqorm decreases the probability that she will run f i r reelection and win $ she runs. Furthermore, the electoral mechanism is found to be more efficient when voters are better iermed. Finally, we find that our divergent party plaiJorm model provides a betterfit than the median voter model.

Evidence on voter preferences from unrestricted choice referendums

“…DeCanio (1980) showed that there were smaller forecast errors involving the optimal mix of corn and wheat in Kansas counties that had higher educational expenditures and older workers. Husted, Kenny, and Morton (1995) found that education, age, and race had the expected effects on how politically informed voters are, which in turn affected how responsive voters are to deviations from voter wishes (see Schmidt, Kenny, & Morton (1996)). effect on opposition to the proposed millage rate in the first two regressions.…”

Why candidate divergence should be expected to be just as great (or even greater) in competitive seats as in non-competitive ones

“…For example, Ansolabehere et al (2001), applying the scaling methodology of Heckman and Snyder (1997) to data over the period , find that congressional candidates "have primarily espoused the ideology associated with the national party, moderating very little to accommodate local ideological conditions" (p. 136). Adams et al (2004) find that, controlling for voters' partisan loyalties and other variables, the vote shares of US Senate candidates increase as they take stands that diverge from the center of their state's voter distribution in the direction of their partisan constituencies, while Kenny and Lotfinia (2005) and Schmidt et al (1996) report research on senate and presidential elections that supports the hypothesis that candidates derive electoral benefits in general elections from appealing on policy grounds to their partisan constituencies. Similar non-convergence results are found in Snyder (1994); Wright (1997, 2000); Burden (2001); Lee et al (2004);and Clinton (2006).…”

Evidence on the importance of spatial voting models in presidential nominations and elections

“…Senators who deviate from their party's position are less likely to get reelected, or even to seek reelection, than those whose records are close to the appropriate state party platform. 5 More importantly, Schmidt, Kenny, and Morton (1996) found that distance to the state party position better explains reelection success than distance to the median voter's position.…”