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This article uses the Tiebout hypothesis to explain variations in private school enrollments across metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Each MSA is viewed as an educational marketplace where families sort themselves into school districts. The typical district is expected to be more heterogeneous in MSAs that have fewer districts and thus have less complete sorting. As district heterogeneity rises, dissatisfaction with the quality of education chosen by the median voter grows and private enrollment increases. The variation of income in each school district, school expenditures, and private school enrollment are mutually determined in a three-equation system. The model is estimated for 129 MSAs, using 1980 data at the school district level. The results are generally supportive of the theory. Secular private enrollments are positively related to income heterogeneity. State policies that reduce choice among public school districts within MSAs result in greater secular private school enrollment. Finally, revenue increase limitations also increase private enrollments.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Wed, 30 Dec 2015 23:46:34 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsResearch on political mobility has ignored the impact that the past policy decisions of officials may have on the probability of achieving a higher elected office. A large theoretical and empirical literature suggests that voters and party members will evaluate incumbents based on past behavior, that is, retrospectively. We test the extent nonincumbent candidates anticipate that voters in primaries and general elections will choose retrospectively, utilizing behavior in one elected office as a basis for voting for a candidate for a "higher" elected office. We explain U.S. House member decisions to run for the U.S. Senate in 1960-88 and the probability that a representative will be selected as the party's candidate. We find that those representatives whose ADA scores are closest to the estimated successful state ADA score for their party are most likely to seek higher offices and to be selected as their party's standard-bearers. Our evidence further suggests that a divergent platform specification fits the data better than a specification in which party positions are predicted to converge to the platform desired by the median voter. We replicate many of the important findings in this literature and also produce some evidence that mobility into the Senate is less common for those who have some power in the House and is more common for those who are wealthier.

Many have questioned whether voters are able to hold incumbent officials electorally accountable through a retrospective voting strategy. We examine U.S. Senate elections from 1962 to 2 990 in fbrty-one states, explaining which incumbents ran fbr reelection and their success in seeking reelection. We find that an incumbent's deviation from her state party plaqorm decreases the probability that she will run f i r reelection and win $ she runs. Furthermore, the electoral mechanism is found to be more efficient when voters are better iermed. Finally, we find that our divergent party plaiJorm model provides a betterfit than the median voter model.