Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality

New foundations for counterfactuals

“…For every 5 factual world w in W there is exactly one potential chance measure ch w in CH such that (w, ch w ) is in U. Therefore, for any two universes u = (w u , ch u ) and u = (w u , ch u ) from U: if w u = w u , then ch u = ch u , and hence u = u .…”

What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case?

“…6 Much like the Strong Law of Large Numbers it considers a sequence of A-V-measurable functions X 1 , . .…”

Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory

“…The latter end in turn is a (necessary, but insufficient) means to attaining the end of always having only true beliefs, and as many as possible thereof. Brössel and Eder and Huber (forthcoming) discuss the importance of this result as well as its Bayesian role‐model, Joyce's (; ) ‘non‐pragmatic vindication of probabilism’, for considering epistemic rationality a form of instrumental rationality and for means–ends epistemology in general. Alternatively one may use the representation result by Hild and Spohn () or the rank‐theoretic decision theory by Giang and Shenoy () to obtain a justification of ranking theory that is more deontological in spirit.…”