Evolution and Kantian morality

Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W.

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.006

Cited by 82 publications

(57 citation statements)

References 45 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…These arguments are expanded to m player symmetric games in Alger and Weibull [8]. See Section 3.3 for a discussion of assortativity of types in games with more than two players.…”

Section: Assortativity and Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Following work in the biology literature on the evolution of assortativity (e.g., Cara et al [77], Dieckmann and Doebeli [102], Matessi et al [234], Otto et al [277], Pennings et al [279], Servedio [321]), Newton [268] shows that under a specification of type-specific assortativity given by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman [81] and applied to the model of Alger and Weibull [7] discussed in Section 3.1, stability is only possible when an incumbent population behaves efficiently and does not interact at all with invading τ types, thus ensuring that σ = 1 in (8). Perfectly assortative efficient behavior is not susceptible to invasion, but everything else is.…”

Section: Individual Types and Assortativitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The share of each type of individual then evolves according to the replicator dynamic. Alger and Weibull [8] (see Section 3.1) consider a similar situation in which types correspond to a continuous space of preferences over fitness. Even more generally, Jensen and Rigos [186] consider matching protocols that group individuals from a population to play m player, n strategy symmetric games.…”

Section: Generalized Assortative Matching Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance

Newton

2018

Games

177

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces. Paying particular attention to the work of young researchers, this essay surveys the progress made over the last decade towards understanding these phenomena, and discusses open research topics of importance to economics and the broader social sciences.

show abstract

“…These arguments are expanded to m player symmetric games in Alger and Weibull [8]. See Section 3.3 for a discussion of assortativity of types in games with more than two players.…”

Section: Assortativity and Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Individual Types and Assortativitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Generalized Assortative Matching Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance

Newton

2018

Games

177

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…1 If preferences are transmitted across generations and if they a¤ect the expected survival and reproduction-the …tness-of their bearer: which preferences are likely to be favored by evolution and which preferences are likely to disappear? Analysis of the long-term evolution of preference distributions can help understand the proximate drivers and motivation of human behavior in social and economic interactions (Hirshleifer, 1977, Bergstrom, 1996, Binmore 1998, Robson, 2001, Newton, 2018, Alger and Weibull, 2019. Here we build on previous work on strategy evolution in structured populations (Lehmann, Alger, and Weibull, 2015) by studying preference evolution in such populations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Compared to the existing economics literature on preference evolution in social interactions (see Alger and Weibull, 2019, for a recent survey), our model makes two key innovations. 3 First, it explicitly analyzes the e¤ects of population structure and limited dispersal upon behavior and preferences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of preferences in structured populations: genes, guns, and culture

Alger

Weibull

Lehmann

2018

Preprint

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

During human evolution, individuals interacted mostly within small groups that were connected by limited migration and sometimes by con ‡icts. Which preferences, if any, will prevail in such scenarios? Building on population biology models of spatially structured populations, and assuming individuals'preferences to be their private information, we characterize those preferences that, once established, cannot be displaced by alternative preferences. We represent such uninvadable preferences in terms of …tness and in terms of material payo¤s. At the …tness level, individuals can be regarded to act as if driven by a mix of self-interest and a Kantian motive that evaluates own behavior in the light of the consequences for own …tness if others adopted this behavior. This Kantian motive is borne out from (genetic or cultural) kin selection. At the material-payo¤ level, individuals act as if driven in part by self-interest and a Kantian motive (in terms of material payo¤s), but also in part by other-regarding preferences towards other group members. This latter motive is borne out of group resource constraints and the risk of con ‡ict with other groups. We show how group size,

show abstract

Dynamic Games of Common-Property Resource Exploitation When Self-image Matters

Long

2020

Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The purpose of this paper is to model the influence of Kantian moral scruples in a dynamic environment. Our objectives are two-fold. Firstly, we investigate how a Nash equilibrium among agents who have moral scruples may ensure that the exploitation of a common property renewable resource is Pareto efficient at every point of time. Secondly, we outline a prototype model that shows, in an overlapping generation framework, how a community's sense of morality may evolve over time and identifies conditions under which the community may reach a steady state level of morality in which everyone is perfectly Kantian.

show abstract

Evolution and Kantian morality

Cited by 82 publications

References 45 publications

Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance

Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance

Evolution of preferences in structured populations: genes, guns, and culture

Dynamic Games of Common-Property Resource Exploitation When Self-image Matters

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About