Evolution of altruistic punishments among heterogeneous conditional cooperators

Abstract

It has been known that altruistic punishments solve the free rider problem in public goods games. Considering spatial structure and considering pure strategies significant advances have been made in understanding the evolution of altruistic punishments. However, these models have not considered key behavior regularities observed in experimental and field settings, where the individuals behave like conditional cooperators who are more willing to donate and are also more willing to punish free riders. Considering these behavioral regularities, without imposing a spatial structure on the population, I propose an evolutionary agent-based model in which agents behave like conditional cooperators, each agent’s donation conditional on the difference between the number of donations in the past and the threshold value and the propensity value of the agent. Altruistic punishment depends on the difference between the threshold value of the focal agent and the randomly matched another agent. The simulations show that, for certain inflicted costs of punishments, generous altruistic punishments evolve and stabilize cooperation. The results show that, unlike previous models, it is not necessary to punish all free riders equally; it is necessary to do so in the case of the selfish free riders but not in the case of negative reciprocators.

Cooperation without punishment

“…As far as altruistic punishment is concerned, it is ineffective when the possibility arises for punishing the cooperators, e.g., due to bribery 42 or imperfect information 43 . Moreover, this mechanism does not distinguish between those who free ride due to selfish interests and those who free ride only because others are doing so 44 . Overall, punishment can override altruistic motives, leading individuals to free ride as soon as the opportunity arises to evade punishment 45 – 47 .…”

“…Our novel alternative to punishment builds on the reciprocal nature of the trust—the fact that people reciprocate voluntary trust 68 —as well as the conditional nature of human cooperation—the fact that negative reciprocity can be switched to positive reciprocity given sufficient cooperation levels 44 , 69 – 71 . More specifically, it has been observed that most people reciprocate trust when the initial act of trust is taken voluntarily 68 , e.g., as is the case with successful business organizations who foster a culture of trust by placing trust in others 72 – 74 .…”

Co-evolution of conditional cooperation and social norm

“…In collective scenarios 4 , 8 , 10 , 40 , 58 – 60 , such as social dilemmas 5 , 6 , 8 , the second approach emphasizes the inherent altruistic nature of human behavior 61 – 71 , explicitly highlighting concepts such as reciprocity, fairness, and retaliation 72 . Several significant models rooted in reciprocity have been proposed elsewhere 73 .…”

“…In the realm of the conditional nature of cooperation, theoretical examinations 68 , 86 – 89 and experimental investigations have explored conditional cooperation 11 , 90 – 93 . The author of this paper has undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of conditional cooperation, considering various scenarios, for example, by scrutinizing a wide array of imitation strategies (Battu 71 ; Battu et al 70 ; Battu and Rahwan 68 ; Battu and Srinivasan 69 ). In this context, individuals tend to emulate those who not only achieve higher payoffs but also enjoy a superior reputation.…”