Evolution of conventions in games between behavioural rules

Khan, Abhimanyu

doi:10.1007/s40505-021-00204-0

Econ Theory Bull

2021

DOI: 10.1007/s40505-021-00204-0

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Evolution of conventions in games between behavioural rules

Abhimanyu Khan

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Cited by 2 publications

References 27 publications

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Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk–dove game

et al. 2022

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We study the long-run dynamics of a repeated non-symmetric hawk–dove type interaction between agents of two different populations. Agents choose a strategy based on their previous experience with the other population by sampling from a collective memory of past interactions. We assume that the sample size differs between populations and define a measure of harshness of conflict in the hawk–dove interaction. We then show how the properties of the long-run equilibrium depend on the harshness of conflict and the relative length of the sample. In symmetric interactions, if conflict is harsh, the population which samples relatively more past interactions is able to appropriate a higher payoff in the long-run, while the population with a relatively smaller sample does so if conflict is mild. These results hold subject to constraints on the sample size which we discuss in detail. We further extend our results to non-symmetric hawk–dove games.

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Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk–dove game

et al. 2022

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Evolutionary Stability of Behavioural Rules

Khan

2021

SSRN Journal

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I develop the notion of evolutionary stability of behavioural rules in a game-theoretic setting. Each individual chooses a strategy, possibly taking into account the game's history, and the manner in which he chooses his strategy is encapsulated by a behavioural rule. The payoffs obtained by individuals following a particular behavioural rule determine that rule's fitness. A population is stable if whenever some individuals from an incumbent behavioural rule mutate and follow another behavioural rule, the fitness of each incumbent behavioural rule exceeds that of the mutant behavioural rule. I show that any population comprised of more than one behavioural rule is not stable, and present necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of a population comprised of a single behavioural rule.

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Evolution of conventions in games between behavioural rules

Cited by 2 publications

References 27 publications

Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk–dove game

Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk–dove game

Evolutionary Stability of Behavioural Rules

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