Evolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity and arbitrary exploration rates

Santos, Fernando P.; Pacheco, Jorge M.; Santos, Francisco C.

doi:10.1038/srep37517

Cited by 38 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 74 publications

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“…The effects of empathy are pronounced: the stationary mean frequency of cooperation ranges from near zero to near unity, in response to increasing the value of the empathy parameter E. For high values of empathy, Stern Judging is the most efficient social norm at promoting cooperation, followed by Simple Standing and Scoring. This rank ordering of social norms is consistent with the prior literature [17,18,19]. However we find a striking reversal from the established view of social norms when individuals are less empathetic.…”

Section: Social Norms That Promote Cooperationsupporting

confidence: 91%

“…The broad consensus in the literature is that Stern Judging is the most efficient norm for promoting cooperation, along with widespread adoption of the discriminator strategy. This result is robust with respect to strategy exploration rates [17], population sizes and error rates [18], and it even extends to the realm of more complex norms of third-and fourth-order [19]. Pacheco et al [15] have additionally shown that Stern Judging is the norm most likely to evolve in a model of group-structured population, because it maximizes the collective payoff of the group.…”

Section: A Model Of Moral Assessment In the Donation Gamementioning

confidence: 67%

“…However, prior studies of cooperation and moral assessment [8,15,14,20,17,18]) have assumed that reputations are objective and common knowledge in the populationmeaning that opinions about reputations do not differ among individuals. Here we relax this assumption and allow individuals to differ in their opinions about one another.…”

Section: A Model Of Moral Assessment In the Donation Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

“…And so the level of empathy strongly influences the amount of cooperation that evolves, and it even changes the ordering of which social norms are best at promoting cooperation. In particular, Stern judging is the most socially beneficial norm [15,17,18,19] only when individuals account for subjectivity in moral assessment, or when individuals are forced to agree with one another through a centralized institution of moral assessment.…”

Section: Social Norms That Promote Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition to the deterministic replicator-dynamics analysis of strategy evolution, we performed a series of individual-based simulations to measure mean levels of cooperation under continuous influx of mutations in the strategy space ( [17]). We assume that all individuals follow the same social norm and are characterized by the same value of empathy, E. The population consists of N individuals, each with its own strategy and its own subjective list of reputations.…”

Section: Stochastic Simulationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolution of empathetic moral evaluation

Radzvilavicius

Stewart

Plotkin

2018

Preprint

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Social norms can promote cooperation in human societies by assigning reputations to individuals based on their past actions. A good reputation indicates that an individual is worthy of help and is likely to reciprocate. A large body of research has established the norms of moral assessment that promote cooperation and maximize social welfare, assuming reputations are objective. But if there is no centralized institution to provide objective moral evaluation, then opinions about an individual's reputation may differ across a population. Here we use evolutionary game theory to study the effects of empathy -the capacity to make moral evaluations from the perspective of another person. We find that empathetic moral evaluation tends to foster cooperation by reducing the rate of unjustified defection. The norms of moral evaluation previously considered most socially beneficial depend on high levels of empathy, whereas different norms are required to maximize social welfare in populations unwilling or incapable of empathy. We demonstrate that empathy itself can evolve through social contagion and attain evolutionary stability under most social norms. We conclude that a capacity for empathetic moral evaluation represents a key component to sustaining cooperation in human societies: cooperation requires getting into the mindset of others whose views differ from our own.

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Section: Social Norms That Promote Cooperationsupporting

confidence: 91%

Section: A Model Of Moral Assessment In the Donation Gamementioning

confidence: 67%

Section: A Model Of Moral Assessment In the Donation Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Social Norms That Promote Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Stochastic Simulationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Evolution of empathetic moral evaluation

Radzvilavicius

Stewart

Plotkin

2018

Preprint

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Off-line synthesis of evolutionarily stable normative systems

Morales

Wooldridge

Rodŕıguez-Aguilar

et al. 2018

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst

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Within the area of multi-agent systems, normative systems are a widely used framework for the coordination of interdependent activities. A crucial problem associated with normative systems is that of synthesising norms that will effectively accomplish a coordination task and that the agents will comply with. Many works in the literature focus on the on-line synthesis of a single, evolutionarily stable norm (convention) whose compliance forms a rational choice for the agents and that effectively coordinates them in one particular coordination situation that needs to be identified and modelled as a game in advance. In this work, we introduce a framework for the automatic off-line synthesis of evolutionarily stable normative systems that coordinate the agents in multiple interdependent coordination situations that cannot be easily identified in advance nor resolved separately. Our framework roots in evolutionary game theory. It considers multi-agent systems in which the potential conflict situations can be automatically enumerated by employing MAS simulations along with basic domain information. Our framework simulates an evolutionary process whereby successful norms prosper and spread within the agent population, while unsuccessful norms are discarded. The outputs of such a natural selection process are sets of codependent norms that, together, effectively coordinate the agents in multiple interdependent situations and are evolutionarily stable. We empirically show the effectiveness of our approach through empirical evaluation in a simulated traffic domain.

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Picky losers and carefree winners prevail in collective risk dilemmas with partner selection

Santos

Mascarenhas

Santos

et al. 2020

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst

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Understanding how to design agents that sustain cooperation in multi-agent systems has been a long-lasting goal in distributed artificial intelligence. Proposed solutions rely on identifying free-riders and avoiding cooperating or interacting with them. These mechanisms of social control are traditionally studied in games with linear and deterministic payoffs, such as the prisoner’s dilemma or the public goods game. In reality, however, agents often face dilemmas in which payoffs are uncertain and non-linear, as collective success requires a minimum number of cooperators. The collective risk dilemma (CRD) is one of these games, and it is unclear whether the known mechanisms of cooperation remain effective in this case. Here we study the emergence of cooperation in CRD through partner-based selection. First, we discuss an experiment in which groups of humans and robots play a CRD. This experiment suggests that people only prefer cooperative partners when they lose a previous game (i.e., when collective success was not previously achieved). Secondly, we develop an evolutionary game theoretical model pointing out the evolutionary advantages of preferring cooperative partners only when a previous game was lost. We show that this strategy constitutes a favorable balance between strictness (only interact with cooperators) and softness (cooperate and interact with everyone), thus suggesting a new way of designing agents that promote cooperation in CRD. We confirm these theoretical results through computer simulations considering a more complex strategy space. Third, resorting to online human–agent experiments, we observe that participants are more likely to accept playing in a group with one defector when they won in a previous CRD, when compared to participants that lost the game. These empirical results provide additional support to the human predisposition to use outcome-based partner selection strategies in human–agent interactions.

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Evolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity and arbitrary exploration rates

Cited by 38 publications

References 74 publications

Evolution of empathetic moral evaluation

Evolution of empathetic moral evaluation

Off-line synthesis of evolutionarily stable normative systems

Picky losers and carefree winners prevail in collective risk dilemmas with partner selection

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