Evolution of coordinated alternating reciprocity in repeated dyadic games

Browning, Lindsay; Colman, Andrew M.

doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.04.032

Cited by 50 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Locally, solving dyadic games with three players takes some technique of visualization of the cube of situations in pure strategies [6], [10], whereupon dyadic games with four players and more are solved purely in analytics, requiring more computational resources [10], [36]. Naturally, that finite noncooperative games with greater numbers of pure strategies at their players (three and more) are significantly hard to solve them [10], [37], [38].…”

Section: Solving Noncooperative Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Uniform Sampling of the Infinite Noncooperative Game on Unit Hypercube and Reshaping Ultimately Multidimensional Matrices of Player’s Payoff Values

Romanuke

2015

Electrical, Control and Communication Engineering

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-The paper suggests a method of obtaining an approximate solution of the infinite noncooperative game on the unit hypercube. The method is based on sampling uniformly the players' payoff functions with the constant step along each of the hypercube dimensions. The author states the conditions for a sufficiently accurate sampling and suggests the method of reshaping the multidimensional matrix of the player's payoff values, being the former player's payoff function before its sampling, into a matrix with minimally possible number of dimensions, where also maintenance of one-to-one indexing has been provided. Requirements for finite NE-strategy from NE (Nash equilibrium) solution of the finite game as the initial infinite game approximation are given as definitions of the approximate solution consistency. The approximate solution consistency ensures its relative independence upon the sampling step within its minimal neighborhood or the minimally decreased sampling step. The ultimate reshaping of multidimensional matrices of players' payoff values to the minimal number of dimensions, being equal to the number of players, stimulates shortened computations.

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Section: Solving Noncooperative Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Uniform Sampling of the Infinite Noncooperative Game on Unit Hypercube and Reshaping Ultimately Multidimensional Matrices of Player’s Payoff Values

Romanuke

2015

Electrical, Control and Communication Engineering

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“…Taking turns could be a suitable solution [62]. While simple symmetrical cooperation is typically found for the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma [2,3,[44][45][46]49,52,55,59,64,67,69], emergent alternating reciprocity has been recently discovered for the games Leader and Battle of the Sexes [11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…• Moreover, blinker strategies may survive in repeated games played by a mixture of finite automata [5] or result through evolutionary strategies [11,15,16,38,39,42,43,74].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to these, reaching a phase-coordinated alternating state is only one problem. Exploratory behavior and suitable punishment strategies are important to establish asymmetric oscillatory reciprocity as well [11,20]. Moreover, we will discuss several coefficients characterizing individual behavior and chances for the establishment of cooperation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How Individuals Learn to Take Turns: Emergence of Alternating Cooperation in a Congestion Game and the Prisoner's Dilemma

Helbing

Schönhof

Stark

et al. 2005

Advs. Complex Syst.

113

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In many social dilemmas, individuals tend to generate a situation with low payoffs instead of a system optimum ("tragedy of the commons"). Is the routing of traffic a similar problem? In order to address this question, we present experimental results on humans playing a route choice game in a computer laboratory, which allow one to study decision behavior in repeated games beyond the Prisoner's Dilemma. We will focus on whether individuals manage to find a cooperative and fair solution compatible with the systemoptimal road usage. We find that individuals tend towards a user equilibrium with equal travel times in the beginning. However, after many iterations, they often establish a coherent oscillatory behavior, as taking turns performs better than applying pure or mixed strategies. The resulting behavior is fair and compatible with system-optimal road usage. In spite of the complex dynamics leading to coordinated oscillations, we have identified mathematical relationships quantifying the observed transition process. Our main experimental discoveries for 2-and 4-person games can be explained with a novel reinforcement learning model for an arbitrary number of persons, which is based on past experience and trial-and-error behavior. Gains in the average payoff seem to be an important driving force for the innovation of time-dependent response patterns, i.e. the evolution of more complex strategies. Our findings are relevant for decision support systems and routing in traffic or data networks.

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“…Browning and Colman also investigated how coordinated, alternating cooperation can evolve without any communication between agents who play battle of the sexes game [5]. They study the nature, properties and phenomena of coordinated alternating cooperation in a range of dispersion games with asymmetric equilibria.…”

Section: Generalized Rsp Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

The Wisdom of Networked Evolving Agents

Namatame

Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

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Summary:The fact that selfish behavior may not achieve full efficiency at the collective level has been well also known in the literature. Therefore we need to cope with the socio-economic system by attempting to stack the deck in such a way that individuals with selfish incentives have to do what is the desirable thing. Of particular interests is the question how social interactions can be restructured so that agents are free to choose their own actions while avoiding outcomes that none would have chosen. In this paper, we study the collective construction process of social norms by networking evolving agents. Social norms are here treated as emerged behavioral rules that constitute constraints on social interactions so that they can achieve efficient and equitable outcomes.

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Evolution of coordinated alternating reciprocity in repeated dyadic games

Cited by 50 publications

References 23 publications

Uniform Sampling of the Infinite Noncooperative Game on Unit Hypercube and Reshaping Ultimately Multidimensional Matrices of Player’s Payoff Values

Uniform Sampling of the Infinite Noncooperative Game on Unit Hypercube and Reshaping Ultimately Multidimensional Matrices of Player’s Payoff Values

How Individuals Learn to Take Turns: Emergence of Alternating Cooperation in a Congestion Game and the Prisoner's Dilemma

The Wisdom of Networked Evolving Agents

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