Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism

Mohtashemi, Mojdeh; Mui, Lik

doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(03)00143-7

Cited by 98 publications

(80 citation statements)

References 18 publications

(18 reference statements)

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“…Therefore, both the lack of information and the prevalence of unconditional altruists may, surprisingly, stabilise cooperation. A stable mix of discriminating and undiscriminating altruists which cannot be invaded by defectors, is also obtained by assuming that as players grow older, their social network grows, and with it their information about their co-players' past 54,55 . Alternatively, if the discriminating strategy distinguishes between justified and unjustified defection, the population can converge to discriminators only, which cannot be invaded by unconditional strategies 39 .…”

Section: Binary Assessment or The World In Black And Whitementioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of indirect reciprocity

Nowak

Sigmund

2005

Nature

2,323

1,615

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Section: Binary Assessment or The World In Black And Whitementioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of indirect reciprocity

Nowak

Sigmund

2005

Nature

2,323

1,615

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“…But as population size (or inter-group mobility) increases, such direct estimates become too limited in scope. Communication with third parties about the past behavior of othersin a word, gossip -could potentially fill this gap (Mohtashemi & Mui, 2003;Nowak, 2006Nowak, , p. 1561Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004;Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003, p. 119;Smith, 2003, p. 419).…”

Section: Indirect Reciprocitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Communication and collective action: language and the evolution of human cooperation

Smith¹

2010

Evolution and Human Behavior

142

114

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All social species face various "collective action problems" (CAPs) or "social dilemmas," meaning problems in achieving cooperating when the best move from a selfish point of view yields an inferior collective outcome. Compared to most other species, humans are very good at solving these challenges, suggesting that something rather peculiar about human sociality facilitates collective action. This article proposes that language -the uniquely human faculty of symbolic communication -fundamentally alters the possibilities for collective action. I explore these issues using simple game-theoretic models and empirical evidence (both ethnographic and experimental). I review several standard mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation -mutualism, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity and signalinghighlighting their limitations when it comes to explaining large-group cooperation, as well as the ways in which language helps overcome those limitations. Language facilitates complex coordination and is essential for establishing norms governing production efforts and distribution of collective goods that motivate people to cooperate voluntarily in large groups. Language also significantly lowers the cost of detecting and punishing "free riders," thus greatly enhancing the scope and power of standard conditional reciprocity. In addition, symbolic communication encourages new forms of collectively beneficial displays and reputation management -what evolutionists often term "signaling" and "indirect reciprocity." Thus, language reinforces existing forces that favor the evolution of cooperation, as well as creating new opportunities for collective action not available even to our closest primate relatives.

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“…Again, this is unrealistic. Usually, players often have only limited information, and sometimes none at all (Mohtashemi and Mui, 2003;Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b). If they do not know the antecedents of their co-player, they need a 'default' rule.…”

Section: Just As In Ohtsuki Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

Uchida¹,

Sigmund

2010

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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Indirect reciprocity is one of the basic mechanisms to sustain mutual cooperation.Beneficial acts are returned, not by the recipient, but by third parties. Indirect reciprocity is based on reputation and status: it pays to provide help because this makes one more likely to receive help in turn. The mechanism depends on knowing the past behavior of other players, and assessing that behavior. There are many different systems of assessing other individuals, which can be interpreted as rudimentary moral systems (i.e. views on what is 'good' or 'bad'). In this paper, we describe the competition of some of the leading assessment rules called SUGDEN and KANDORI by analytic methods. We show that the sterner rule KANDORI has a slight advantage in the sense that KANDORI-players have more chance to earn higher payoff than SUGDEN-players in the presence of unconditional altruists. On the other hand, we see that the unconditional altruists are eliminated in the long run and that stable polymorphisms of KANDORI and SUGDEN can subsist, but that a moral consensus is realized even in those polymorphic states: all players' images are the same in each observer's eyes.

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Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism

Cited by 98 publications

References 18 publications

Evolution of indirect reciprocity

Evolution of indirect reciprocity

Communication and collective action: language and the evolution of human cooperation

The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

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