Evolution of indirect reciprocity

Nowak, Martin A.; Sigmund, Karl

doi:10.1038/nature04131

Cited by 2,319 publications

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“…As mentioned in Nowak and Sigmund (2005), there are two main motivations to pursue its investigation. One concerns the evolution of human communities: how does cooperation work in villages and small-scale societies?…”

Section: Just As In Ohtsuki Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

Uchida¹,

Sigmund

2010

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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Indirect reciprocity is one of the basic mechanisms to sustain mutual cooperation.Beneficial acts are returned, not by the recipient, but by third parties. Indirect reciprocity is based on reputation and status: it pays to provide help because this makes one more likely to receive help in turn. The mechanism depends on knowing the past behavior of other players, and assessing that behavior. There are many different systems of assessing other individuals, which can be interpreted as rudimentary moral systems (i.e. views on what is 'good' or 'bad'). In this paper, we describe the competition of some of the leading assessment rules called SUGDEN and KANDORI by analytic methods. We show that the sterner rule KANDORI has a slight advantage in the sense that KANDORI-players have more chance to earn higher payoff than SUGDEN-players in the presence of unconditional altruists. On the other hand, we see that the unconditional altruists are eliminated in the long run and that stable polymorphisms of KANDORI and SUGDEN can subsist, but that a moral consensus is realized even in those polymorphic states: all players' images are the same in each observer's eyes.

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Section: Just As In Ohtsuki Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

Uchida¹,

Sigmund

2010

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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“…How did our own social systems originate and maintain themselves in the teeth of the evolutionary advantage apparently gained by 'cheats', who take the group benefit without paying the accompanying individual cost? Studies of metaphors for this problem, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), seem to me mostly to give useful answers only under implausibly restrictive assumptions (reviewed in [50]). A blend of network dynamics with PD metaphors might provide more robust answers to this question [51,52].…”

Section: Network Structure and Infectious Disease Dynamicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Network structure and the biology of populations

May¹

2006

Trends in Ecology & Evolution

281

228

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“…An important reason to develop the bet hedging model for mutualism, was to investigate if a mutualistic strategy could beat parochial strategies such as kin selection and tag-based selection, which remained unbeaten in theoretical work (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003;Nowak and Sigmund, 2005;Nowak, 2006;Fletcher and Doebeli, 2009). Here it is confirmed that, whereas kin selection and inclusive fitness benefits increase with relatedness to a partner, bet hedging benefits decrease with relatedness (Eq.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At the same time, if the allele is associated with a recognizable tag, preferential collaboration with kin amounts to preferential collaboration with tag-carriers. Important examples of tag selection mechanisms are the green beard, beard chromodynamics, and 'phenotypic similarity' (Dawkins, 1976;Riolo et al, 2001;Nowak and Sigmund, 2005;Nowak, 2006;Janssen and van Baalen, 2006;Antal et al, 2009). In short, both kin selection and tag-based selection are opposed by mutualistic strategies that promote cooperation with non-related and non-tagged partners.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is known that mutualism can be modelled by a Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) (Trivers, 1971), and that titfor-tat-like strategies can sustain mutualistic cooperation in presence of cheaters (Frank, 1994;Doebeli and Knowlton, 1998;Bergstrom and Lachmann, 2003;Yamamura et al, 2004). However, this does not explain how it can outcompete kin selection (for reviews on cooperation see Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003;Nowak and Sigmund, 2005;Nowak, 2006).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bet hedging based cooperation can limit kin selection and form a basis for mutualism

Uitdehaag¹

2011

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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International audienceMutualism is a mechanism of cooperation in which partners that differ help each other. As such, mutualism opposes mechanisms of kin selection and tag-based selection (for example the green beard mechanism), which are based on giving exclusive help to partners who are related or carry the same tag. In contrast to kin selection, which is a basis for parochialism and intergroup warfare, mutualism can therefore be regarded as a mechanism that drives peaceful coexistence between different groups and individuals. Here the competition between mutualism and kin (tag) selection is studied. In a model where kin selection and tag-based selection are dominant, mutualism is promoted by introducing environmental fluctuations. These cause reduction in reproductive success by the mechanism of variance discount. The best strategy to counter variance discount is to share with agents who experience the most anticorrelated fluctuations, a strategy called bet hedging. In this way, bet hedging stimulates cooperation with the most unrelated partners, which is a basis for mutualism. Analytic results and simulations reveal that, if this effect is large enough, mutualistic strategies can dominate kin selective strategies. In addition, mutants of these mutualistic strategies that experience fluctuations that are more anticorrelated to their partner, can outcompete wild type, which can lead to the evolution of specialization. In this way, the evolutionary success of mutualistic strategies can be explained by bet hedging-based cooperation

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Evolution of indirect reciprocity

Cited by 2,319 publications

References 66 publications

The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

Network structure and the biology of populations

Bet hedging based cooperation can limit kin selection and form a basis for mutualism

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