Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification

Abstract

What are the consequences of evolutionary theory for the epistemic standing of our beliefs? Evolutionary considerations can be used to either justify or debunk a variety of beliefs. This paper argues that evolutionary approaches to human cognition must at least allow for approximately reliable cognitive capacities. Approaches that portray human cognition as so deeply biased and deficient that no knowledge is possible are internally incoherent and self‐defeating. As evolutionary theory offers the current best hope for a naturalistic epistemology, evolutionary approaches to epistemic justification seem to be committed to the view that our sensory systems and belief‐formation processes are at least approximately accurate. However, for that reason they are vulnerable to the charge of circularity, and their success seems to be limited to commonsense beliefs. This paper offers an extension of evolutionary arguments by considering the use of external media in human cognitive processes: we suggest that the way humans supplement their evolved cognitive capacities with external tools may provide an effective way to increase the reliability of their beliefs and to counter evolved cognitive biases.

What makes weird beliefs thrive? The epidemiology of pseudoscience

“…However, a hidden assumption in this argument, which needs to be spelled out more clearly, is that lack of epistemic warrant is a problem in the first place. In evolutionary epistemology, the default assumption is that human cognition is geared towards true belief and reliable inference, especially in ecologically relevant conditions, because those are generally adaptive strategies for getting a firm grip on the world in which the organism needs to survive and reproduce (De Cruz, Boudry, De Smedt, & Blancke, 2011;McKay & Dennett, 2009).…”

Natural Selection Does Care about Truth

“…For example, evolution may endow us with 'fast and frugal' heuristics (Gigerenzer 2008) that sacrifice some accuracy for efficiency and speed; evolved cognitive mechanisms may produce occasional false belief as a result of asymmetries in the costs associated with different errors (Haselton and Buss 2000); cognitive mechanisms may be accurate or truth-conducive in adaptively familiar environments but lead us astray in new or modern environments; adaptive beliefs may be roughly accurate approximations of the world though limited in other respects. Evolution may select true belief in some domains, but not necessarily in others (De Cruz et al 2011;Wilkins and Griffiths 2012). However, misbelief that is directly adaptive turns out to be hard to find (McKay and Dennett 2009).…”

“…Helen De Cruz et al (2011) have distinguished between evolutionary supportive arguments (ESA), which ground the truth-tracking abilities of our cognitive faculties in their evolutionary origins, and evolutionary debunking arguments (EDA), which try to sever or block at least one of the steps in the supportive ESA. The general framework of the ESA runs roughly like this:…”

Darwinism in metaethics: What if the universal acid cannot be contained?

“…After having sketched how this objection is usually construed (3.1), we will consider a different way of construing it (3.2). Then, we will underline how the strategy 8 For other epistemological difficulties facing EDAs' supporters, see De Cruz et al 2011.…”