Evolutionary Ecology, Elite Feasting, and the Hohokam: A Case Study from a Southern Arizona Platform Mound

Abstract

A number of researchers have shown that the abundance, diversity, and size of prey consumed or displayed at a feast can be used by elites to solidify and/or aggrandize their social position. Expectations for archaeological signatures of elite feasting—derived from ethnographic studies, archaeological research, and ecological theory—are used to assess the archaeofaunal record from selected contexts of the Marana platform mound site, located in southern Arizona. The magnitude of work conducted in the region provides a unique opportunity to address the importance of feasting as a mechanism of power consolidation among Hohokam elites. Here, we examine a hypothesized locus of elite feasting among the Classic period Hohokam (ca. A.D. 1250). A relatively high concentration of animal bone derived from a burned room adjacent to the Marana platform mound was first thought to represent debris from elite feasting. Analysis reveals a proportionate taxonomic profile that is similar to the remainder of the community and an overwhelming abundance of small game relative to large prey. Neither situation is consistent with elite feasting expectations. These results argue for a form of feasting among non-elites that likely served to promote intragroup solidarity or political support within the community.

Large game, agricultural land, and settlement pattern change in the eastern Mimbres area, southwest New Mexico

“…However, artiodactyls were probably highly desirable both as food (particularly as a source of protein and fat) and for social reasons (Driver, 2002;Grimstead and Bayham, 2010;Nelson and Schollmeyer, 2003;Spielmann and Angstadt-Leto, 1996). Puebloan ethnographies suggest that the ''willingness'' of large mammals to be captured depended on proper social behavior by hunters, and declines in large mammal availability were historically viewed as symptomatic of problems with the social and natural environment (Beaglehole, 1936;Parsons, 1925;Potter, 2004).…”

Universal History and the Emergence of Species Being

“…It is clear that ritual feasting was a common practice (Arnold 1996) and could promote social solidarities unrelated to reproduction (Grimstead and Bayham 2010). Gift exchange or potlatch also cemented social relations and included those transcending local production (Tollefson 1995).…”

Prestige and Prejudice: The Role of Long Distance Big Game Hunting as an Optimal Foraging Decision

“…T he use of signaling theory is increasingly tributes to this dialogue (i.e. Grimstead 2010; prominent in anthropological publications Whittaker and Carpenter, this issue), such as American Antiquity and Current An interesting conundrum in debates among Anthropology, and especially Behavioral Ecology archaeologists about the relevance of costly sigand Sociobiology (Figure 1). Clearly signaling naling research is whether the procurement of theory has much to offer anthropology, particu-big game could serve as an optimal reproductive larly for bridging evolutionary ecology and social tactic, an optimal foraging decision, or both detheory (e.g., B liege Bird and Smith 2005; B liege pending on the context.…”

“…Clearly signaling naling research is whether the procurement of theory has much to offer anthropology, particu-big game could serve as an optimal reproductive larly for bridging evolutionary ecology and social tactic, an optimal foraging decision, or both detheory (e.g., B liege Bird and Smith 2005; B liege pending on the context. Grimstead ( ) ad-Bird et al 2001Grimstead and Bayham 2010). dressed this conundrum by considering the role of The use of signaling theory in archaeology has distance in determining pay-offs; specifically, at spurred lively debate ( • 100…”

“…(distance, transport costs, and caloric returns) addressed these questions (Grimstead 2010). The model was designed to maximize procurement costs, which minimized the distance at which a large-game item would transition from an efficient economic strategy into a costly signal.…”