Evolutionary game analysis of enterprise carbon emission regulation based on prospect theory

Sun, Hao; Gao, Guangkuo; Li, Zonghuo

doi:10.1007/s00500-022-07527-5

Cited by 17 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…built an evolutionary game model of the government, contractors, and the public to study the problem of project quality supervision. Sun et al (2022) constructed an evolutionary game model based on prospect theory to study carbon emission regulation. Xia et (al.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

China's Insurance and Green Economy Development in the Context of Sustainable Development

Xie,

Li,

Hafeez

2024

Frontiers Research Topics

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Frontiers is more than just an open access publisher of scholarly articles: it is a pioneering approach to the world of academia, radically improving the way scholarly research is managed. The grand vision of Frontiers is a world where all people have an equal opportunity to seek, share and generate knowledge. Frontiers provides immediate and permanent online open access to all its publications, but this alone is not enough to realize our grand goals. Frontiers journal seriesThe Frontiers journal series is a multi-tier and interdisciplinary set of openaccess, online journals, promising a paradigm shift from the current review, selection and dissemination processes in academic publishing. All Frontiers journals are driven by researchers for researchers; therefore, they constitute a service to the scholarly community. At the same time, the Frontiers journal series operates on a revolutionary invention, the tiered publishing system, initially addressing specific communities of scholars, and gradually climbing up to broader public understanding, thus serving the interests of the lay society, too. Dedication to qualityEach Frontiers article is a landmark of the highest quality, thanks to genuinely collaborative interactions between authors and review editors, who include some of the world's best academicians. Research must be certified by peers before entering a stream of knowledge that may eventually reach the public -and shape society; therefore, Frontiers only applies the most rigorous and unbiased reviews. Frontiers revolutionizes research publishing by freely delivering the most outstanding research, evaluated with no bias from both the academic and social point of view. By applying the most advanced information technologies, Frontiers is catapulting scholarly publishing into a new generation. What are Frontiers Research Topics?Frontiers Research Topics are very popular trademarks of the Frontiers journals series: they are collections of at least ten articles, all centered on a particular subject. With their unique mix of varied contributions from Original Research to Review Articles, Frontiers Research Topics unify the most influential researchers, the latest key findings and historical advances in a hot research area.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

China's Insurance and Green Economy Development in the Context of Sustainable Development

Xie,

Li,

Hafeez

2024

Frontiers Research Topics

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“…In terms of carbon emission reduction, Zhang et al [45] used the two-party evolutionary game model of prospect theory to study the interactive relationship between local governments and port enterprises in the context of green port construction. Sun et al [46] established an evolutionary game model between the government and enterprises based on prospect theory. This study considered the strategic choices of the government and enterprises under different risk levels of air quality deterioration, and found that under low-risk conditions, the government tends to adopt passive supervision.…”

Section: Research On Prospect Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Low-Carbon Incentive Behaviour of Power Battery Recycling Based on Prospect Theory

Li,

Zhang

2024

Sustainability

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Power batteries, the core component of the rapidly evolving electric vehicle industry, have increasingly become a focal point of attention. Recycling power batteries can mitigate environmental pollution and utilize resources efficiently, which is crucial for fostering a low-carbon economy and achieving sustainable development. Utilizing prospect theory, this study proposes a tripartite game model for low-carbon innovation in power battery recycling, involving government agencies, power battery manufacturers, and recycling enterprises. This paper initially identifies the evolutionary stability strategy, subsequently simulates the evolutionary process through parameter assignment, and explores parameter sensitivity along with comparative effects. This study indicates the following: (i) Government incentives are pivotal in motivating manufacturers and recyclers towards low-carbon innovation. (ii) Reducing technology costs and enhancing spillovers significantly boost low-carbon innovation’s appeal. (iii) Moderate carbon taxes can encourage businesses to engage in low-carbon innovation, while excessively high taxes may increase operating costs and hinder investment in innovation. Lastly, policy recommendations are made in order to support environmental preservation and the industry’s sustainable growth in the power battery recycling sector.

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“…Yang et al (2021) built an evolutionary game model of the government, contractors, and the public to study the problem of project quality supervision. Sun et al (2022) constructed an evolutionary game model based on prospect theory to study carbon emission regulation. Xia et (al.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game and simulation analysis on quality supervision of low-carbon renovation of high-carbon emission enterprises under the reward and punishment mechanism

Weng

Yuan

et al. 2023

Front. Environ. Sci.

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From the perspective of multi-stakeholders, considering the rent-seeking phenomenon existing in the inspection and acceptance of low-carbon renovation under the government’s reward and punishment mechanism, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, third-party testing institutions, and high-carbon emission enterprises, analyzes the stability of the evolutionary strategies of all parties involved, and tests the influence of the reward and punishment mechanism, rent-seeking cost, and the cost difference between high carbon and low carbon on the choice of tripartite strategies through simulation. Finally, the stability of the equilibrium point in the tripartite game system is verified. The results show that 1 the government’s increase in the reward and punishment mechanism will promote the low-carbon renovation of high-carbon emission enterprises and the refusal to rent-seeking behavior choices, but the increase in incentives will weaken the government’s supervision; 2 the reward and punishment mechanism set by the government must meet the condition that the sum of the strength of the reward and punishment mechanism for each party is greater than its speculative income, so as to ensure the quality of low-carbon renovation of high-carbon emission enterprises; 3 the greater the rent-seeking cost paid by high-carbon emission enterprises, the more conducive it is to avoiding the unqualified low-carbon renovation of high-carbon emission enterprises; and 4 under the premise of certain sales revenue, the greater the cost difference between low-carbon production and high-carbon production, the lower the willingness of enterprises to low-carbon renovation. Therefore, reducing the production cost difference is an effective way to promote the low-carbon renovation of high-carbon emission enterprises.

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Evolutionary game analysis of enterprise carbon emission regulation based on prospect theory

Cited by 17 publications

References 38 publications

China's Insurance and Green Economy Development in the Context of Sustainable Development

China's Insurance and Green Economy Development in the Context of Sustainable Development

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Low-Carbon Incentive Behaviour of Power Battery Recycling Based on Prospect Theory

Evolutionary game and simulation analysis on quality supervision of low-carbon renovation of high-carbon emission enterprises under the reward and punishment mechanism

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