Aiming at the problem that the government regulates the carbon emission of enterprises, this paper introduces the prospect theory to correct the revenue function of government and enterprise, considering the risk of air quality deterioration, built an evolutionary game model of government and enterprise based on prospect theory.According to the weight of the two sides on the probability of air quality deterioration under the equilibrium state, the risk of air quality deterioration is divided into three levels: low, medium and high. Analyzed the evolution strategy of government and enterprise under different levels. The results show that when the risk of air quality deterioration is low, the government tends to negative regulation and enterprises adopt traditional production. When the risk of air quality deterioration is high, government tend to be positive in regulation and enterprises are inclined to low-carbon production at the beginning. However, with the implementation of enterprises low-carbon production, government departments will turn to negative regulation. At the same time, there will be incentive paradox phenomenon in the process of government regulation of carbon emissions.In the long run, it is more effective to strengthen the punishment of government departments' ineffective supervision than to punish enterprises.

Back cover image: Composite polymer electrolytes (CPEs) are regarded as one of the most promising electrolytes for practical commercial applications. However, the unsatisfactory ionic conductivity, limited electrochemical stability and relatively low mechanical strength obstruct the long‐term usage of CPEs‐based batteries. Covalent organic frameworks (COFs) permit atomically precise integration of organic units into extended structure with periodic skeletons and ordered nanopores, providing a new direction in CPEs. In article number https://doi.org/10.1002/cey2.190, Zheng and co‐workers reported that the design of unique COFs, the synthesized COFs powers and the flexible CPEs exhibit in the river of time, which reveal the road of scientific research.

New buildings continue to be constructed in historic districts as urbanization accelerates. This leads to incongruities between historic and modern buildings, as well as degradation of the historic landscape. As a means of resolving these problems, this study uses the expert scoring method to solicit opinions from relevant experts through anonymous methods for architectural samples and establishes two groups of architectural images that have been screened for objective color attribute analysis. Comparing the architectural color codes on site was conducted using the Chinese Architectural Color Card based on the Munsell color system. Furthermore, questionnaires were used to measure the differences in visual comfort between different building types by asking the subjects to rate architectural colors when viewing architectural images. This study will also combine the advantages of measurement and analysis of objective objects with the study of human perceptual experience in order to enhance its practicality. In general, the buildings in the West Nanjing Road Historic Landscape District are painted in warm yellow, and the public is aware of its comforting color. Both historical and modern buildings in the historic district are mostly of medium and high brightness, and both use low-purity colors for the main body of their structures. Despite some differences between people of different genders, ages, and literacy levels, all of them agree on the main tone of warm yellow color in architectural colors.

In the background of green and low-carbon development, many enterprises still have illegal emission behaviors to obtain excess revenue. Therefore, it is an urgent problem to restrain the illegal emission behaviors of enterprises through external supervision. This paper mainly studies the regulatory system composed of government and enterprises. We divide the regulation into two phases: loose regulation and strict regulation, analyzed the impact of government regulatory intensity on carbon emission behavior enterprises and industry market structure through the evolutionary game model. The results show that with the increase of the intensity of government supervision, leading enterprises will gradually complete the transformation and upgrading from low carbon to compliant production. The leading enterprises with low carbon technology have strengthened their dominant position in the market, while the enterprises without low carbon technology are constrained by carbon emissions and can only continue to stay in the industry market by buying carbon emission rights or exiting the market. The industry market structure gradually changed from a decentralized competition structure to a centralized oligopoly structure.

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