Evolutionary game analysis of environmental pollution control under the government regulation

Abstract

This paper studied a tripartite evolutionary game of stakeholders in environmental pollution control. Most previous studies on this issue are limited to a focus on system dynamics with two-party game problems and lack a spatial analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study, which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of sewage enterprises, governments and the public. We establish a payment matrix and replicator equations as our method, and we also implement parameter simulations in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in environmental pollution control. Specifically: intensifying rewards and penalties will help encourage sewage enterprises to meet the discharge standard and the public to participate in pollution control action. However, increased rewards will reduce government's willingness to adopt incentive strategies; Government's reward for public's participation in the action must be greater than the increased cost of participation; Reducing the cost of sewage enterprise can also encourage them to implement standard emissions. The research presented in this paper further improves standard emissions and designs reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.

Towards a green mining future: A dynamic evolutionary game model for collaborative waste recycling

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Research on multiple co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution in China on the perspective of ENGOs and public participation

“…However, previous studies have only taken the interests of local government, farmers and agribusinesses into account, ignoring the interaction among LPBE, ENGOs and public participation for multiple co-governance. In fact, public participation has a strong influence on the strategic choices of stakeholders in environmental issues [ 41 , 42 ]. As such, this paper takes local government and LPBE as the main decision-making bodies, and constructs an evolutionary game model for the collaborative governance of agricultural non-point source pollution based on the participation of the public and ENGOs, Compared with previous studies, the model in this study fully considers the limited rationality and dynamic decision-making process in which stakeholders learn and influence each other, and also pays full attention to the impact of ENGOs and public participation on the game system.…”

Evolutionary game study on the governance and development of online car-hailing based on blockchain technology

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