Evolutionary game analysis of green production transformation of small farmers led by cooperatives based on prospect theory

Liu, Wenlong; Liu, Zhenya

doi:10.3389/fenvs.2022.1041992

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…However, a constructer who abandons cooperation and withdraws halfway through the project will cause serious losses to be suffered by the developer, resulting in delays in construction. If the design and construction consortium becomes extremely unstable, not only will great economic losses be suffered by the developer but design change behaviors will be triggered [41]. If a consortium member commits a breach of contract when the developer initiates a design change, the developer may seek a new partner to complete future work.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Cooperative Evolutionary Game of Design and Construction Consortium of Green Building Project under Design Change

Wang

Geng

et al. 2023

Buildings

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In recent years, with the country’s vigorous promotion of green buildings and the increasingly complex and large-scale engineering projects, the design-construction consortium model can better meet the needs of the organization and implementation of large-scale green projects and become a realistic choice for enterprises in project implementation. Therefore, the formation of a good and stable cooperative relationship between consortium members is increasingly important in improving project revenue and quality. The issue of maintaining the stability of consortium relationships is an urgent problem to be solved at this stage. As such, a three-party evolutionary game model, based on evolutionary game theory, comprising the developer unit, design unit, and construction unit, is constructed here. Then, strategies for ensuring evolutionary stability under different design modalities are discussed. Finally, the influence of relevant parameters under changing design conditions on the stability of the design and construction consortium of green building projects is analyzed through numerical simulation. The research results show the following: (1) If the additional revenue distribution coefficient within the consortium members is closer to 0.5, the influence on the stability of the design and construction consortium will be smaller; in contrast, if the influence on the design and construction consortium is increased, the cooperative relationship within the consortium will be more unstable. (2) The presence of additional revenue can increase the stability of the design and construction consortium. An increase in the additional revenue will inhibit the instability of the consortium on the one hand and strengthen the stability of the consortium on the other but will also lead to the occurrence of opportunistic behavior. (3) The construction unit’s payment of a subsidy to the cooperative members can help promote the stability of the design and construction consortium to a certain extent and can also weaken the effects of other factors on the stability of the consortium, but there is a threshold value for the amount of said subsidy. (4) On the one hand, the cooperation members actively cooperate with each other to maximize the cooperation benefits of the design and construction consortium, while on the other hand, the construction unit actively promotes the implementation of the green building project, strictly monitors the implementation of the green design and green construction approach by the design and construction units in the early and implementation stages of the project, prevents the design changes caused by the final product failing to meet the green building standard, and actively solves design change problems in a manner that benefits the sustainable development of the green building, so that the cooperative relationship among the members of the consortium can develop steadily, which is beneficial to the green and ecological development of architectural design and construction.

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Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Cooperative Evolutionary Game of Design and Construction Consortium of Green Building Project under Design Change

Wang

Geng

et al. 2023

Buildings

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“…Liu et al used prospect theory to construct a targeted incentive for building units [31]. Liu et al constructed a prospect theory-based game model to incentivize smallholder farmers to transition to green production [32]. Qu et al introduced prospect theory to construct an evolutionary game model and discussed how the government should incentivize firms to innovate [33].…”

Section: Current Study Of Prospect Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Location-Based Crowdsensing Incentive Mechanism Based on Ensemble Learning and Prospect Theory

Liu,

Xu,

Deng

et al. 2023

Mathematics

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Crowdsensing uses the participants’ smart devices to form a new perception network. The coverage of crowdsensing’s tasks determines the quality of services. Under the constraint of budget and the number of participants, the platform needs to increase the participation duration of participants through incentive mechanisms to increase the coverage of tasks. There are two problems with the existing incentive mechanisms: (1) many incentives ignore the participants’ characteristics, and using a single incentive mechanism for different participants will make the incentive effect not reach the expectation; (2) many incentives will affect the effectiveness because of the decision problem caused by asymmetric information. Inspired by ensemble learning and prospect theory, this paper proposes the Incentive Mechanism based on Ensemble Learning and Prospect Theory (IMELPT). First, we propose the Deep-Stacking-Generation algorithm based on Dropout (DSGD), to predict the participants and distinguish whether they are long-term or short-term participants. If the participants are short-term, we incentivize them through the Short-term Participant Incentive Mechanism based on Prospect Theory (SPIMPT). We increase the participation duration by transforming the change in reward into asymmetric information that aligns the participant’s goal with the platform. If the participants are long-term participants, we motivate them through the Long-term Participant Incentive Mechanism (LPIM), to maintain the participation rate of participants by maximizing their utility. Theoretical analysis and experiments on real datasets demonstrated that IMELPT can reliably improve the coverage of crowdsensing tasks.

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Can rural e-commerce contribute to carbon reduction? A quasi-natural experiment based on China’s e-commerce demonstration counties

Du,

Wang,

Zhang

2023

Environ Sci Pollut Res

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Evolutionary game analysis of green production transformation of small farmers led by cooperatives based on prospect theory

Cited by 4 publications

References 35 publications

Research on Cooperative Evolutionary Game of Design and Construction Consortium of Green Building Project under Design Change

Research on Cooperative Evolutionary Game of Design and Construction Consortium of Green Building Project under Design Change

A Location-Based Crowdsensing Incentive Mechanism Based on Ensemble Learning and Prospect Theory

Can rural e-commerce contribute to carbon reduction? A quasi-natural experiment based on China’s e-commerce demonstration counties

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