Evolutionary Game Study on the Development
of Green Agriculture in China Based on
Ambidexterity Theory Perspective

Cui, Herui; Zhao, Tian; Pei-jun, Tao

doi:10.15244/pjoes/87139

Cited by 33 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…Cui et al constructed evolutionary game models between the government and farmers, farmers and agricultural enterprises, to attempt to obtain the best stable strategy for better green technology diffusion. Their results indicated that slashing green production costs and supervision cost of government were crucial for the best stable strategy [30].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

Zhou

2020

IJERPH

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This paper focuses on the sustainable development dilemma of agricultural production in China under the pattern of intensive management, which is seriously challenged by agricultural non-point source pollution. The key to effectively break through the dilemma is to promote the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control by stakeholders including local governments, new agricultural operators and traditional farmers. Accordingly, this paper discusses the interactive decision-making relationships between new agricultural operators and traditional farmers under the guidance of local governments, by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model, as well as analyzing evolutionary cooperative stability strategies and realizing the simulation of evolution processes in different scenarios by MATLAB. The results show that new agricultural operators play a leading role in agricultural non-point source pollution control, whose strategies have effects such as technology spillover. The rewards from the superior government will support local governments in taking proactive action in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control, and then local governments can offer technical support and subsidies to new agricultural operators and traditional farmers for reducing their costs. Furthermore, this paper also finds that there are green synergy effects among the groups, where the variations of parameters and strategies by one group would affect the two others. Additionally, agricultural land operation rights transfers would cause traditional farmers to take more time to cooperate in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control. In order to promote the multi-agent co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control under intensive management pattern, this paper suggests that it should be necessary to reduce their costs and improve incentives, as well as to increase the common interests among groups and enhance their green synergy effects.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

Zhou

2020

IJERPH

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“…In their study, they used evolutionary game theory to unpack the interactive strategies of the polluting enterprise, local government regulators, and central government planners. Cui et al studied the green agriculture game through building an evolutionary game between the government and the farmer [17].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Production Supervision Considering Limited Resources of the Enterprise

Ma¹,

Wan²,

Jin³

2021

Pol. J. Environ. Stud.

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“…7e dynamic game process is a mixed strategy game and the diversification of strategy selection. Under certain probability conditions, the game process is adjusted according to the strategy of the other one [42]. 8As AI enterprises, their technical threshold is very high.…”

Section: Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Coordination Mechanism of Value Cocreation of Innovation Ecosystems: Evidence from a Chinese Artificial Intelligence Enterprise

Chen

Guo

et al. 2021

Complexity

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This paper models the game process of the value cocreation of enterprises based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The factors influencing value cocreation are found through mathematical analysis. Taking iFLYTEK as an example, a representative enterprise of artificial intelligence (AI) in China, six factors affecting value cocreation are verified, which are the excess return rate, the distribution coefficient of the excess return rate, coordination costs in the system, the cost-sharing coefficient, imitation costs, and penalties. These six factors have a profound impact on value cocreation in the ecosystem. Through the case study of iFLYTEK, it is concluded that innovation ecosystems can enable small- and medium-sized AI enterprises to grow. In order to build a sound ecosystem, we need to establish a mechanism to select partners, reduce the costs of cooperation, and strengthen the protection of intellectual property. At the beginning of the cooperation, it is necessary to establish a mechanism with clear responsibilities, rights, and interests. The conclusion is of great significance to the development of AI enterprises.

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Evolutionary Game Study on the Development of Green Agriculture in China Based on Ambidexterity Theory Perspective

Cited by 33 publications

References 42 publications

An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Production Supervision Considering Limited Resources of the Enterprise

Research on the Coordination Mechanism of Value Cocreation of Innovation Ecosystems: Evidence from a Chinese Artificial Intelligence Enterprise

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