Executions, Motivations, and Accomplishments

Israël, David; Perry, John; Tutiya, Syun

doi:10.2307/2185682

Cited by 35 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 1 publication

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…We will consider here only two of them. Israel, Perry, and Tutiya (1993) have called the problem of the wrong movement. The problem is that the failure of an action cannot always be traced back to the falsity of some belief figuring in the motivating complex as it is conceived of in the standard model.…”

Section: Motor Representations and Their Philosophical Relevancementioning

confidence: 99%

Intentions and Motor Representations: the Interface Challenge

2016

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A full account of purposive action must appeal not only to propositional attitude states like beliefs, desires, and intentions, but also to motor representations, i.e., non-propositional states that are thought to represent, among other things, action outcomes as well as detailed kinematic features of bodily movements. This raises the puzzle of how it is that these two distinct types of state successfully coordinate. We examine this so-called "Interface Problem". First, we clarify and expand on the nature and role of motor representations in explaining intentional action. Next, we characterize the respective functions of intentions and motor representations, the differences in representational format and content that these imply, and the interface challenge these differences in turn raise. We then evaluate Butterfill & Sinigaglia's (2014) recent answer to this interface challenge, according to which intentions refer to action outcomes by way of demonstrative deference to motor representations. We present some worries for this proposal, arguing that, among other things, it implicitly presupposes a solution to the problem, and so cannot help to resolve it. Finally, we suggest that we may make some progress on this puzzle by positing a "content-preserving causal process" taking place between intentions and motor representations, and we offer a proposal for how this might work.

show abstract

Section: Motor Representations and Their Philosophical Relevancementioning

confidence: 99%

Intentions and Motor Representations: the Interface Challenge

2016

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However, this standard causal model of action explanation is faced with several difficulties. I will here consider only one of them, the problem of the wrong movement, pointed out by Israel, Perry and Tutiya (1993). 1 The problem is that the failure of an action cannot always be traced back to the falsity of some belief figuring in the motivating complex as it conceived of in the standard model.…”

Section: The Problem Of the Wrong Movementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonconceptual Representations for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control

Pacherie

2011

Social Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relationships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-directed movements underscores the capacity to acquire executable concepts of these movements, thus allowing them to come under intentional control. On the other hand, the degree of autonomy these nonconceptual representations enjoy, and the specific temporal constraints stemming from their role in motor control, set limits on intentional control over action execution.

show abstract

“…Une cinquieme difficulte apparait avec ce qu 'Israel, Perry et Tutiya (1993) appellent le «probleme du mouvement inapproprie» {wrong movement). L'echec d'une action ne peut pas toujours etre rapporte a la faussete d'une croyance figurant dans le complexe motivant tel que le concoit le modele D/C.…”

Section: Les Problemes Rencontres Par L'approche Causale En Termes Deunclassified

La dynamique des intentions

Pacherie

2003

Dialogue

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary not just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions, and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its functions, its type of content, its dynamics, and the rationality and time constraints that bear on it. I then try to show how the difficulties encountered by the causal theory can be solved within this new framework.

show abstract

Executions, Motivations, and Accomplishments

Cited by 35 publications

References 1 publication

Intentions and Motor Representations: the Interface Challenge

Intentions and Motor Representations: the Interface Challenge

Nonconceptual Representations for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control

La dynamique des intentions

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About