Nonconceptual Representations for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control

Abstract

In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relationships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-directed movements underscores the capacity to acquire executable concepts of these movements, thus allowing them to come under intentional control. On the other hand, the degree of autonomy these nonconceptual representations enjoy, and the specific temporal constraints stemming from their role in motor control, set limits on intentional control over action execution.

Learning verbs more effectively through meaning congruent action animations

“…It has been argued elsewhere that it is necessary to posit representations of action whose content is non-conceptual (e.g., Pacherie, 2011). The relevant point being that perceptual experience can be represented without an understanding of the concepts underlying that perception, and in fact is suggested to be an explanation for the acquisition of observational concepts (see Pacherie, 2011). Furthermore, the context sentence plays an important role in supporting the simulation.…”

Through the forest of motor representations

“…A widely agreed idea about MRs is that they are due to the dorsal stream (Pacherie, 2000(Pacherie, , 2011 and, given its encapsulation, MRs are not normally consciously accessible (Pacherie, 2000(Pacherie, : sec. 5, 2002(Pacherie, : 63, 2006(Pacherie, : 14, 2007(Pacherie, : 8, 2011Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003: 252-255, 186, and sec.…”

Why we may not find intentions in the brain

“…For example, a state can be said to represent the intention to grasp an apple (content) when it makes us grasp an apple in the appropriate situation (function). More generally, Pacherie (2011) claims that "intentions can have a causal impact on action by virtue of their contents" (p. 67, our italics) suggesting a tight coupling between function and content. Finally, it is essential to explanations and predictions of behavior to indicate which intentions play the causally crucial roles in the production of behavior.…”