Executive antecedents of interfirm cooperation

Abstract

Much of the present research and theory on cooperation is devoid of the effects of the individual actors. Although previous research recognizes the vital role of key managers in regard to cooperation, there is limited research on executive‐related antecedents of interfirm cooperation. This manuscript extends our understanding of cooperative outcomes by theorizing how executive characteristics and social forces may impact an executive's cooperative behavior. We develop a model that encompasses executive personality, cooperative tendencies, cultural distance, trust, and justice perceptions in addition to their implications for interfirm cooperation outcomes. Specifically, we extend socio‐analytic theory to an interfirm context. Furthermore, we integrate theories of exchange and attraction to discuss how social forces moderate the relationship between cooperative tendencies and cooperative outcomes.

Processes Underlying Interfirm Cooperation

“…In simple terms, firms use IFC when such arrangements are in comparison to internalization or market transactions deemed to possess an efficient form of business governance (Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011). However, managing and benefitting from IFC is often complicated, for a variety of reasons: (a) lack of compatibility in partners' motivation, power and organizational culture; (b) various contractual complications, escalating tensions and conflicts; (c) unanticipated or unmanageable macroeconomic uncertainties and changes; and (d) failure to anticipate and deal with IFC evolution over time (Abdi and Aulakh, 2012;Beamish and Lupton, 2016;Gur, Bendickson and Solomon, 2020;Nippa and Reuer, 2019).…”

“…Fourth, we urge future scholars to focus more on individual managers and teams to understand how IFC sub-processes unfold and grow (Buckley and De Mattos, 2021;Gur, Bendickson and Solomon, 2020). This is because it is the managers, and not lifeless companies, who create, develop and manage IFC (Contractor et al, 2019;Mueller, 2021).…”

“…Accumulated research in this domain suggests that IFC may take many forms, ranging from simple contractual agreements between buyers and suppliers, trade associations or co-branding, to more complicated licensing, franchising, joint ventures and strategic alliances (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa and Bagherzadeh, 2015; Oliver, 1990;Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011). Extant research further suggests that a wide variety of antecedents at the individual, organizational, environmental and national level determine the formation and growth of IFC (for details, see Beamish and Lupton, 2009;Gur, Bendickson and Solomon, 2020;Kale and Singh, 2009;Martin, Romero and Wegner, 2019). In addition, prior research highlights that IFC can significantly impact firm-level outcomes (Bruyaka, Philippe and Castañer, 2018;Lyu et al, 2020;Wu, Lii and Wang, 2015), as well as influence outcomes at the partnership level (Abdi and Aulakh, 2012;Beamish and Lupton, 2016;Jiang et al, 2020).…”

Interfirm cooperation and engagement barriers in a family business context

“…Founders and managers have a decisive role in the propensity for cooperative engagement (Birru, 2011; Gur et al , 2019; Martin et al , 2019; McGrath and O’Toole, 2013). Indeed, the whole strategic orientation towards cooperation can be influenced by their characteristics (Kim and Vonortas, 2014).…”

“…A general disinterest in cooperation, due to a lack of knowledge about its specific success factors and benefits, is one of the main reasons why firms do not develop cooperative approaches (McGrath and O’Toole, 2013). As interfirm cooperation is often context-dependent, experientially based and embedded in the founder/manager (Birru, 2011; Gur et al , 2019; McGrath and O’Toole, 2013), some personal characteristics are pointed out as hurdles such as lack of openness and cooperative tendency (Gur et al , 2019), network capacities (McGrath and O’Toole, 2013), being change and risk-averse (Roessl, 2005) and the desire for control (McGrath and O’Toole, 2013).…”