Executive Behavior: A Creditor Perspective on Managerial Ownership

Anderson, Ronald C.; Mansi, Sattar; Reeb, David M.

doi:10.1002/9781118258439.ch22

Cited by 3 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…Despite these findings, there are fewer studies investigating the role of corporate policies towards insider trading activities in the capital markets [6,37]. Effective corporate policies are possible with an effective internal governance structure such as sizeable board, more influence of independent board members and separation of two positions of the company (chief executive and chairperson of the board) that are known to enhance corporate disclosure and more information efficiency [10,17].…”

Section: Why Corporate Governance?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…associated with more corporate disclosure and enhanced monitoring of the board [10,17]. This means split boards will have negative or inversely relationship with insider trading activities and insider performance in the capital market.…”

Section: Journal Of Finance and Economicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The presence of a founding member on the board of directors may affect the level of corporate disclosure to the capital markets as they are associated with less public disclosure due to fair of competition and impairment of their interest. [10,17,30]. Founding members will want less public disclosure if they feel that this might impair their interests and this means that it may offer more opportunity for insiders to trade opportunistically and also enhance insider performance.…”

Section: Foundersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Excess in cash flows may encourage managers to increase their personal expenditure, undertake risk investment that will increase firm value but at the expense of shareholders capital [41]. The presence of debt in the company contributes to more effective monitoring as debt holders want to ensure that the company continues to pay its debts in the future [10,22]. This also implies that there is a negative relationship between debt level and insider trading activities and performance in the capital market..…”

Section: Debt Financingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Further, evidence has suggested that good governance enhances board monitoring, increases accountability to management, enhances corporate performance and reduces the cost of financing [10,11]. On the other side studies showed that corporate insiders have been performing significantly higher than other investors from their stock transactions [1,12,13,14].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Do Board Characteristics Matter to Insider Timing and Profitability in the US Market?

Kiwia¹

2017

JFE

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In this paper I analyze the relationship between insider trading and corporate governance characteristics.Despite, the widely held view that insider trading significantly affects stock prices; little is known about what causes such market inefficiency and whether firm characteristics matters. This paper focuses on the impact of board structure towards insider trading and stock price efficiency. Using an event study methodology, this paper analyzes the influence of different board characteristics on insider profits as measured by share price abnormal returns. It also uses purchase ratio as a proxy for insider trading activities. Findings suggest that higher board independence, small board size and high debt levels have a significant influence towards reducing insider profits. The trading activities of insiders appear to have no significant relationship to the corporate governance characteristics of the firm. The overall results suggest that good governance reduces insider abnormal profits and increase stock price efficiency. With regards to insider trading activities we found little evidence suggesting corporate governance impact insider trading associated with future cash-flows. The study uses a sample of 250 firms from S&P 500 Index from 2000 to 2005.

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Section: Why Corporate Governance?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Journal Of Finance and Economicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Foundersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Debt Financingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Do Board Characteristics Matter to Insider Timing and Profitability in the US Market?

Kiwia¹

2017

JFE

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Gender diversity in the boards and the pricing of publicly traded corporate debt: evidence from Japan

Tanaka

2014

Applied Financial Economics

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This article explores the impact of gender-diverse boards on the cost of publicly traded corporate debt. Using a sample of Japanese corporate bond issues, we find that firms with female outside directors enjoy lower cost of corporate public debt after controlling for corporate governance, bond and firm characteristics. In addition, the results using matching methods also show that the cost of corporate public debt is lower for firms with female outside directors. Overall, these findings indicate the importance of gender-diverse boards in corporate bond markets.

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Relational Pluralism in Boards of Directors: A Multidimensional View

Zhu

2017

Proceedings

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Executive Behavior: A Creditor Perspective on Managerial Ownership

Cited by 3 publications

References 41 publications

Do Board Characteristics Matter to Insider Timing and Profitability in the US Market?

Do Board Characteristics Matter to Insider Timing and Profitability in the US Market?

Gender diversity in the boards and the pricing of publicly traded corporate debt: evidence from Japan

Relational Pluralism in Boards of Directors: A Multidimensional View

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