Executive Power in American Institutional Development

Abstract

In striking contrast to the legislatures in most modern democracies, Congress retains an important place in American politics and policy making. Especially in recent years, this has led many observers to question the importance of the presidency and bureaucracy to the real work of American governance and the extent to which political actors in the executive branch generally exercise power. This narrative of congressional dominance has been particularly bolstered by recent scholarly interest in principal-agent models of interbranch relations. The assumption of congressional centrality, however, obscures many important features of American politics. Over the course of American history, institutional development in particular has often been driven by either autonomous executive action or conflicts between Congress and the executive. We develop an approach for assessing executive power in institutional politics and illustrate the logic of executive influence with three cases: the rise of federal food-and-drug and forestry regulation, and the growth of the federal farm extension service in the early twentieth century; the rise of the national security state in the mid-twentieth century; and the evolution of budgeting and spending practices over the course of the twentieth century.

Delegating Direct Democracy: Interparty Legislative Competition and the Adoption of the Initiative in the American States

“…33 The willingness of minority parties to cede institutional power due to citizen demands may strengthen their standing vis-à-vis the majority party. Of course, for such a momentous shift in institutional power to succeed, there must be a level of political pressure sufficient to convince some members of the majority party to defect (Whittington and Carpenter 2003). Of course, for such a momentous shift in institutional power to succeed, there must be a level of political pressure sufficient to convince some members of the majority party to defect (Whittington and Carpenter 2003).…”

“Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court

“…Interest groups can develop cheap information on the performance of bureaucracies or the preferences of the electorate (Hansen 1991;McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). At the same time, it should be recognized that apparent legislative delegations may be better understood as the exploitation of available political resources and legislative weaknesses by other actors, such as executive branch officials, to enhance their own institutional position (Whittington and Carpenter 2003). Thus, we should be sensitive to the interaction between courts exploiting political opportunities and legislative leaders managing political risk.…”

Presidential Influence in an Era of Congressional Dominance

“…While other research has focused on presidents' roles in state-building activities and bureaucratic expansion (Carpenter 2000;2001;James 2000;Skowronek 1982;Whittington and Carpenter 2003), much less is known about the influence of presidents on public policy in earlier time periods. While other research has focused on presidents' roles in state-building activities and bureaucratic expansion (Carpenter 2000;2001;James 2000;Skowronek 1982;Whittington and Carpenter 2003), much less is known about the influence of presidents on public policy in earlier time periods.…”