2017
DOI: 10.1515/popets-2017-0042
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Expectation-Maximization Tensor Factorization for Practical Location Privacy Attacks

Abstract: Location privacy attacks based on a Markov chain model have been widely studied to de-anonymize or de-obfuscate mobility traces. An adversary can perform various kinds of location privacy attacks using a personalized transition matrix, which is trained for each target user. However, the amount of training data available to the adversary can be very small, since many users do not disclose much location information in their daily lives. In addition, many locations can be missing from the training traces, since m… Show more

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Cited by 18 publications
(22 citation statements)
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“…Even though map-matching has been used as an attack, for instance, against area obfuscation [21], to the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to consider road-network map-matching as a tracking attack. We also note that this choice was further supported by the fact that hidden Markov chains, which are used in mapmatching, have been shown effective in modelling the temporal correlations of location traces [11,24]. A natural extension of this work is to consider other types of both localization and tracking attack, or even inference attacks, such as the extraction of sensitive semantic locations.…”
Section: Location Privacy Attacksmentioning
confidence: 92%
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“…Even though map-matching has been used as an attack, for instance, against area obfuscation [21], to the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to consider road-network map-matching as a tracking attack. We also note that this choice was further supported by the fact that hidden Markov chains, which are used in mapmatching, have been shown effective in modelling the temporal correlations of location traces [11,24]. A natural extension of this work is to consider other types of both localization and tracking attack, or even inference attacks, such as the extraction of sensitive semantic locations.…”
Section: Location Privacy Attacksmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…The considered localization attacks assume the space of exact user locations X to be discrete. Therefore, and similarly to previous works [7,10,24], we have discretized the space for both datasets in a grid of equally spaced cells, where the center of the cell corresponds to a locationstamp that is common to any GPS observation within the cell. For the Geolife dataset, the 5 th ring road of Beijing was partitioned in cells of 2000 × 2000 meters for a total of 17 × 16 cells.…”
Section: Localization Attacksmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…For example, Montjoye et al [22] put forward that an attacker can reproduce user identity information depending on a small quantity of user location information. Worse still, the location trajectories can be de-anonymized even with sufficient privacy protection, including the noise-fuzzy technology or the anonymity technology [23][24][25]. Specifically, in the presence of prior knowledge of user mobility, an optimal inference attack is available [26], e.g., generating the Markov transition matrix of each user.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Using the resembling cloaking strategy, the proposed spatial and temporal transformations in [31] enforce privacy by hiding mutual proximity. Concerning other realistic scenarios with sparse data and missing location problems, Murakami uses multiple learning methods to resist location privacy attacks based on a Markov chain model [23]. Besides, some LPPMs improve location privacy protection via considering locations semantic.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%