Expectations data in structural microeconomic models

Alternative Models of Preference Heterogeneity for Elicited Choice Probabilities

“…Let x njt and p njt denote non-price and price 7 Random utility models of the expectation-choice relation have been estimated in a variety of settings spanning personal financial outcomes (e.g., Dominitz and Manski, 1997;Hurd et al, 2004;McKenzie et al, 2013), health outcomes (e.g., Delavande, 2008;Tarozzi et al, 2014), returns to schooling (e.g., Arcidiacono et al, 2012;Zafar, 2013;Delavande and Zafar, 2019) and crime (e.g., Lochner, 2007). For an up-to-date survey at the time of writing, see Kos ¸ar and O'Dea (2023).…”

For Better or Worse? Subjective Expectations and Cost-Benefit Trade-Offs in Health Behavior

“…For instance, a person may understand that going out -vis-à-vis never leaving home (the government's recommendation) -implies higher risk of contracting the virus and, if not motivated by one of the essential activities or reasons allowed by the lockdown rules, a positive risk of sanctions. Yet, the person might weigh these 8 We use measurement and econometric tools developed in a growing economic literature on survey expectations, reviewed from various perspectives by Manski (2004Manski ( , 2023, Attanasio (2009), Attanasio, Almas and Jervis (2020), Delavande (2014Delavande ( , 2023, Hurd (2009), Hudomiet, Hurd andRohwedder (2023), Giustinelli and Manski (2018), Giustinelli (2022, Bruine de Bruin et al (2023), Fuster and Zafar (2023), and Koşar and O'Dea (2023), among others. 9 We review the restrictions in detail in Section 2.…”

“…They also illustrate the importance of measuring expectations (or preferences) in addition to choices, to reduce the risk of wrong inferences such as attributing a certain behavior to preferences instead of expectations, or viceversa. For more examples and formal treatments of these issues, see Manski (2004), Delavande (2008), Arcidiacono, Hotz and Kang (2012), van der Klaauw (2012), Zafar (2013), Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2014), Giustinelli (2016), and Koşar and O'Dea (2023), among others.…”

Communicating Social Security Reform

“…This distinction between largely unavoidable uncertainty about the future and inattention to currently available information is fundamental to the role of communication. If uncertainty is largely about fundamental future uncertainties, communicating current policies better will have little effect (Kosar andO'Dea, 2021, Ciani et al, 2019). If instead it is largely a result of passive learning by workers, then more active and better targeted communication has potentially large effects.…”