Experience Counts: Mixed Member Elections and Mexico's Chamber of Deputies

Ugues, Antonio; Vidal, D. Xavier Medina; Bowler, Shaun

doi:10.1080/13572334.2012.646711

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…In the case of Mexico, where legislators are constitutionally prohibited from seeking immediate reelection to the same office, one would expect very little provision of particularistic benefits. Indeed, research on Mexican legislative behavior has suggested legislators have few incentives to engage in constituency service or pork‐barreling activities due to the lack of reelection, party voting in the electorate, and strong party control over the candidate‐selection process (Casar ; Freidenberg ; Nacif ; Ugues Jr., Medina Vidal, and Bowler ; Weldon ; Wuhs ).…”

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confidence: 99%

Pork‐Barreling without Reelection? Evidence from the Mexican Congress

Kerevel

2015

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Previous research on term‐limited legislators suggests they have few incentives to engage in pork‐barreling. Using the case of Mexico, where all legislators are term‐limited, I find legislators participate in federal budget negotiations despite the lack of a reelection incentive. I argue term‐limited legislators are progressively ambitious and use interventions into the budget process to further their careers. I find legislators elected in single‐member districts submit more budget amendments than those elected through proportional representation, conditional on where they intend to pursue future office. I also find governors and gubernatorial elections influence the submission of budget amendments, which is related to gubernatorial influence over political careers.

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confidence: 99%

Pork‐Barreling without Reelection? Evidence from the Mexican Congress

Kerevel

2015

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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“…Most relevant are the studies of Ugues, Vidal, and Bowler (2012) and Kerevel (2015), who leveraged Mexico's MMM (mixed-member majoritarian) system to compare the legislative behavior of federal legislators elected by PR (proportional representation) with those elected in SSDs (single-seat districts). Ugues, Vidal, and Bowler (2012) hypothesize that SSD legislators would be more likely to focus on committees that influence the allocation of funds that could benefit their districts. The authors find no significant difference in the types of committees termlimited legislators serve irrespective of how they were elected.…”

Section: Legislative Behavior and The Party-centered Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral Accountability and Particularistic Legislation: Evidence from an Electoral Reform in Mexico

Motolinia

2020

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Being able to hold politicians accountable is the hallmark of democracy, and central to this is the notion that politicians can run for reelection. Most research on reelection incentives compare politicians who are term-limited with those who are not. These studies concentrate mostly on relatively senior politicians in candidate-centered electoral systems. This article leverages a quasi-natural experiment posed by the staggered implementation of the 2014 Mexican Electoral Reform, which lifted an eighty-year-old ban on reelection. The author conducts a difference-in-differences analysis of the hypothesis that reelection encourages legislators to focus more on policies with the highest “electoral yield”—namely, particularistic legislation. Applying a correlated topic model to a new collection of transcripts from 6,890 legislative sessions in 20 Mexican states between 2012 and 2018, this article presents compelling evidence that it does, that the effect is synchronized with the electoral cycle, and that it is larger when the legislators’ political horizons are longer.

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“…Si bien algunos estudios han analizado la asignación de presidentes de comisión en la Cámara de Diputados mexicana, estos se han enfocado en las estrategias de selección seguidas por los coordinadores tanto para incrementar la influencia de sus respectivas bancadas como para procurar una mejor relación de sus partidos con el electorado y otros actores influyentes (Aparicio y Langston, 2009;Ugues et al, 2012). Empero, la naturaleza teórico-metodológica de estos trabajos no permite dar cuenta de cómo tales asignaciones se vinculan a la institucionalización de la asamblea, entendida esta como un proceso de larga duración.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Presidencias de comisión e institucionalización de la Cámara de Diputados en México (1997-2018)

Juárez

Urbina

2022

Polít. soc.

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El presente artículo estudia la selección de presidentes de comisión como indicador sustantivo de institucionalización parlamentaria. El caso de estudio seleccionado para llevar a cabo dicho análisis es la Cámara de Diputados de México durante los 21 años de congresos no mayoritarios (1997-2018). Esta asamblea resulta apropiada para cuestionar los preceptos tradicionales de la teoría informativa dado el impedimento para la reelección inmediata de sus miembros y la carencia de instituciones que recompensen la experiencia de los representantes con cargos jerárquicos en comisiones. Mediante una base de datos propia con información biográfica, institucional, partidista y electoral de los 3,841 congresistas federales que ocuparon un asiento en la asamblea entre 1997 y 2018, y a partir de modelos logísticos de efectos condicionados, los resultados sugieren que tanto la experiencia parlamentaria de los legisladores como la adquisición de conocimientos en áreas particulares de política pública en espacios alternos al congresional, adquirieron cada vez más relevancia como factores definitorios para el acceso a presidencias de comisión.

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Experience Counts: Mixed Member Elections and Mexico's Chamber of Deputies

Cited by 7 publications

References 19 publications

Pork‐Barreling without Reelection? Evidence from the Mexican Congress

Pork‐Barreling without Reelection? Evidence from the Mexican Congress

Electoral Accountability and Particularistic Legislation: Evidence from an Electoral Reform in Mexico

Presidencias de comisión e institucionalización de la Cámara de Diputados en México (1997-2018)

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