Explaining political jiu-jitsu

Abstract

The use of violent coercion to repress unarmed protests, such as that seen during the Arab Spring, sometimes backfires on the government – an outcome called ‘political jiu-jitsu’. Examining unique global data covering extreme violence used by governments against unarmed protests from 1989 to 2011 (drawn from UCDP) and the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data, this study aims to explain the conditions under which this outcome occurs. This study contributes to both the nonviolent action and one-sided violence literatures by further disaggregating this effect into both domestic and international outcomes, a distinction that has not previously been made in empirical studies. We find evidence that a pre-existing campaign infrastructure increases the likelihood of increased domestic mobilization and security defections after violent repression, but is unrelated to international backlash. Within ongoing NAVCO campaigns we find that parallel media institutions increase the likelihood of increased domestic mobilization and international repercussions after repression, and that this effect holds true for both traditional media and ‘new’ (i.e. internet-based) media. One of the novel contributions of this study is that we identify an important selection effect in the NAVCO data and the critical role of organizational infrastructure, especially communications infrastructure, in generating preference changes that create the conditions where killing unarmed civilians becomes costly for repressive governments. We conclude with a discussion of the potential implications of this study and avenues for future research.

Resistance in repressive contexts: A comprehensive test of psychological predictors.

“…In fact, the belief that forming such a movement is possible even though it might attract "targeted" repression, might result from the belief that mass protests would raise awareness about the pressing grievances and provide proof of the illegitimacy of the government, consequently would attract national, international and media attention as well as support for the protest movement and formation of new alliances (Araj, 2008;Chang, 2008;Sutton, Butcher, & Svensson, 2014;. We acknowledge though, that such thinking might be contingent upon individuals highly valuing the social and economic demands as well as having an ideology aligned with the demands and/or the movement (see DeNardo, 1985).…”

The physics of dissent and the effects of movement momentum

“…No statistical methods were used to pre-determine sample sizes, but our sample sizes are considerably larger than those reported in previous publications. 2,3,8 Measurement. We describe the construction of our variables in the main text however, we offer some additional details on several measures here.…”

Upping the ante without taking up arms: Why mass movements escalate demands

“…Although the state intends to deter dissent, as it would terrorist violence (LaFree, Dugan & Korte, 2009), its countermeasures with regard to a protest movement can also embolden those who are participating as well as encourage others to join or support antiregime activities. Harming civilians, particularly those that are unarmed, violates human rights and social norms, which can lead to condemnation (Sutton, Butcher & Svensson, 2014). To ensure that repression has its intended effect of reducing ‘the internal threat to the regime’s rule’ and allowing the state to maintain control (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999: 517), the state often combines its coercive actions with strategies to diminish the likelihood and/or the severity of the backlash.…”