Explaining right‐wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe: Grievances, opportunities and polarisation

Abstract

Why have some Western liberal democracies experienced more right-wing terrorism and violence (RTV) than others? This question remains largely unanswered in existing research on the extreme right because (1) events data suitable for cross-national comparisons have been lacking, and (2) existing analyses fail to capture RTV's causal complexity, which involve multiple causal paths (equifinality) comprising causal conditions that become sufficient for the outcome only in combination (conjunctural causation). To help fill these gaps, this paper uses new events data from the RTV dataset in a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) research design, aiming to explain variation in the extent of RTV in 18 West European countries between 1990 and 2015. In doing so, the paper identifies two "causal recipes" that consistently distinguish countries with extensive RTV experience from those with low or moderate RTV experience. The first (North European) recipe involves the combination of high immigration, low electoral support for anti-immigration (radical right) parties, and extensive public repression of radical right actors and opinions. The second (South European) recipe involves the combination of socio-economic hardship, authoritarian legacies, and extensive left-wing terrorism and militancy. Notably, both recipes contain elements of "grievances" and "opportunities", suggesting that these two theories, which are conventionally seen as contrasting, may be more fruitfully seen as complementary. Furthermore, a highly polarized conflict between far right activists and their enemies represents a third necessary condition for extensive RTV to occur. A key to combating violent extremism on the far right therefore lies in disrupting rather than accelerating such polarization mechanisms, suggesting that openness and dialogue might work better than public repression, stigmatization, or aggressive confrontation.

Stochastic events can explain sustained clustering and polarisation of opinions in social networks

“…One of the most important types of fragmentation is the polarisation of opinion towards more extremist viewpoints. Polarisation has become increasingly problematic over the past decade, driving community conflict around many social and environmental issues [18][19][20] , as well as political extremism motivating activism and sometimes even violence 21,22 . Because extremist views sometimes lie outside the initial range of opinions, they cannot be explained by homophily and bounded confidence alone.…”

Dynamics of violent and dehumanizing rhetoric in far-right social media

“…In recent decades, Sweden has had relatively high levels of far-right violence (Ravndal, 2018) and two waves of radical-right political representation on the national level -in the early 1990s and in the 2010s onwards. In the 1991 parliamentary election, the rightwing populist party Ny Demokrati (in English, 'New Democracy'), received 7% of the votes, only to drop out for good in 1994.…”

Power distance orientation as an antecedent of individuals’ intentions to engage in radical political action

“…Similarly, there is evidence indicating that the perceived political marginalization (i.e., the inability to express one's grievances) and repression of groups and individuals advocating nonnormative positions may be linked to their radicalization, and the emergence of even more violent forms of political engagement (cf. Allan, Glazzard, Jesperson, Reddy-Tumu, & Winterbotham, 2015;Minkenberg, 2006;Ravndal, 2018). For instance, according to the phenomenon of 'backlashing', state repression of actors pursuing social change might paradoxically contribute to an increase in violence (LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009).…”