Why have some Western liberal democracies experienced more right-wing terrorism and violence (RTV) than others? This question remains largely unanswered in existing research on the extreme right because (1) events data suitable for cross-national comparisons have been lacking, and (2) existing analyses fail to capture RTV's causal complexity, which involve multiple causal paths (equifinality) comprising causal conditions that become sufficient for the outcome only in combination (conjunctural causation). To help fill these gaps, this paper uses new events data from the RTV dataset in a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) research design, aiming to explain variation in the extent of RTV in 18 West European countries between 1990 and 2015. In doing so, the paper identifies two "causal recipes" that consistently distinguish countries with extensive RTV experience from those with low or moderate RTV experience. The first (North European) recipe involves the combination of high immigration, low electoral support for anti-immigration (radical right) parties, and extensive public repression of radical right actors and opinions. The second (South European) recipe involves the combination of socio-economic hardship, authoritarian legacies, and extensive left-wing terrorism and militancy. Notably, both recipes contain elements of "grievances" and "opportunities", suggesting that these two theories, which are conventionally seen as contrasting, may be more fruitfully seen as complementary. Furthermore, a highly polarized conflict between far right activists and their enemies represents a third necessary condition for extensive RTV to occur. A key to combating violent extremism on the far right therefore lies in disrupting rather than accelerating such polarization mechanisms, suggesting that openness and dialogue might work better than public repression, stigmatization, or aggressive confrontation.

Combining new quantitative and qualitative data, this article first describes and compares the evolution of right-wing terrorism and militancy in the Nordic countries between 1990 and 2015. Having established that Sweden has experienced considerably more right-wing terrorism and militancy than the other Nordic countries have, the article then seeks to account for Sweden's outlier position. In doing so, the article draws on three concepts proposed by social movement research: organizational resources, political opportunities, and frame analysis. Applying these concepts to the Nordic countries, the study finds that Sweden's outlier position may result from different WWII experiences, leaving Sweden with a stronger and more resilient extreme right movement, but also from receiving more immigrants while lacking influential anti-immigration (radical right) parties, and from conducting a more restrictive public debate on immigration, leaving little room for anti-immigration concerns in the public sphere. While the first two explanations are consistent with existing research, the third challenges the dominant view on how the public debate on immigration might influence extreme right mobilization and violence.

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