Explaining Wars Fought by Established Democracies: Do Institutional Constraints Matter?

Abstract

Extant re s e a rch has shown that cross-national variations in the level of a country ' s democracy tend to be re l a t e d to its propensity to be involved in external conflict. The dyadic version of the theory of democratic peace contends that democracies rare l y, if ever, fight each other, and it is strongly supported by the available evidence. The monadic version, suggesting that democracies are in general more peaceful re g a rdless of the nature of the other p a rty involved in a relationship, has been less well supported. This article addresses the latter proposition, seeking to explain the variations in war involvement among the established democracies on the basis of major diff e rences in their institutions of governance. Among the various distinctions considered (such as parliamentary versus presidential forms of government, rule by a single dominant party versus a coalition government, and phases of the electoral cycle), a country ' s electoral system turns out to be the most important institutional factor that dampens war involvement. Established democracies with a pro p o rt i o n a t e -re p resentation system tend to have significantly less such involvement according to three alternative measures. We adduce insights from comparative studies of democratic politics to explain this major finding, thereby offering a more specific and cogent account of why this particular institutional arrangement matters for external belligere n c e .

Parliamentary peace or partisan politics? Democracies’ participation in the Iraq War

“…This contrasts with Auerswald (1999), who finds coalition governments restrained in their use of force. Regarding the parliamentary-presidential distinction Reiter and Tillman (2002), as well as Leblang and Chan (2003), report no significant results. Concerning electoral rules, however, these studies find that proportional representation systems are less likely to get involved in war (ibid.)…”

Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints on the Democratic Initiation of Conflict

“…Prins and Sprecher (1999) somewhat surprisingly found that coalition governments are more likely to reciprocate military force during crises than are single-party governments. Leblang and Chan (2001) found that proportional representation systems are less likely to fight wars.…”

Bringing democracy back in: The democratic peace, parliamentary war powers and European participation in the 2003 Iraq War

“…Leblang and Chan (2003) dismiss the importance of intra-legislative and executive-legislative constraints and argue that electoral systems are the most important institutional restraint on governments' war involvement. Similarly, Clark and Nordstrom (2005: 253) conclude that 'systemic differences between democracies (i.e., presidential, parliamentary) exert little systematic effect on conflict propensity'.…”