2002
DOI: 10.1111/0022-3816.00147
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Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints on the Democratic Initiation of Conflict

Abstract: How do domestic political institutions affect the propensity to initiate international conflict? We improve theoretical understanding of and empirical knowledge on this question. We describe three major types of democratic institutional characteristics that have been hypothesized to increase the constraints on conflict initiation: public electoral participation, intra-legislative factors, and a stronger legislature in relation to the executive. Using a Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) model to analyze 37… Show more

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Cited by 131 publications
(142 citation statements)
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“…Could we operationalise the domestic political institutions of democracies and test their influence on their international behaviour? In a number of influential contributions Prins and Sprecher (1999), Ireland and Gartner (2001), Reiter and Tillman (2002), Davis (1997, 1999), Leblang and Chan (2003) and Palmer, London, and Regan (2004) have answered these puzzles with sophisticated quantitative analyses.…”
Section: Bringing 'Foreign Policy' Back In: Explicating the Link Betwmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Could we operationalise the domestic political institutions of democracies and test their influence on their international behaviour? In a number of influential contributions Prins and Sprecher (1999), Ireland and Gartner (2001), Reiter and Tillman (2002), Davis (1997, 1999), Leblang and Chan (2003) and Palmer, London, and Regan (2004) have answered these puzzles with sophisticated quantitative analyses.…”
Section: Bringing 'Foreign Policy' Back In: Explicating the Link Betwmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consider the Iraq case: countries with parliaments having only 'basic' or 'deficient' war powers became more involved militarily, while those with 'comprehensive' powers made little or no contribution (Dieterich et al 2008). In their study on variation in treaty ratification procedures, Reiter and Tillman (2002) found that countries affording stronger voice to legislatures in treaties were less likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes.…”
Section: Institutional Legal and Constitutional Authoritymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Security issues that are salient to the public, and public opinion that challenges the government's preference, can facilitate parliamentary influence in security policy (Reiter and Tillman 2002;Dietrich et al 2009;Author 2010). If the cabinet is out of touch with the sense of the country, parliaments may play their role of representing the will of the people.…”
Section: Public Opinionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The coders of this dataset rated (subjectively) each of the latter dimensions, and these individual ratings are usually summed by analysts to produce an aggregate measure of a country's "democraticness" or "autocraticness." This practice can often conceal more than reveal important differences, 11 because the same aggregate score can reflect very different underlying traits. It is as if a physician simply looks at a patient's body weight without considering this person's age, gender and physical stature (e.g., a short, fat person compared to a tall, thin person).…”
Section: The Economics Of Peace and Security Journal Issn 1749-852xmentioning
confidence: 99%