Explaining women's presence on corporate boards: The institutionalization of progressive gender-related policies

Thams, Yannick; Bendell, Bari L.; Terjesen, Siri

doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.01.043

Cited by 69 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 54 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The main argument here is that the ethos in the public sector is generally more receptive to social issues than in the private sector, and therefore also to gender equality (Brieger et al 2019). Another explanation emphasizes variations in sub-national regulatory policies (Terjesen et al 2009;Thams et al 2018). Austria's Federal Equal Treatment Act initiated measures to support women at all levels of the civil service (Gresch and Sauer 2018), leading to less vertical and horizontal gender segregation in the public sector compared to private businesses.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 94%

The Carrot or the Stick: Self-Regulation for Gender-Diverse Boards via Codes of Good Governance

2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Scholars have emphasized the potential of self-regulation, realized through 'codes of good governance', to improve gender diversity on boards. Yet, unconvinced of the effectiveness of this self-regulation, many regulators have implemented mandatory quota laws. Our study sheds light on this dilemma. Seeking to broaden our conceptual knowledge of how such 'codes' work in the specific case of gender diversity on boards, we ask: Under which conditions is self-regulation via voluntary principles of good governance effective? Expanding recent institutional-theory perspectives from the literature of women on boards, we show that, in the case of Austria, self-regulation via code recommendations is ineffective unless supported by additional forces. The primary reason for this, we argue, is that nominators do not expect benefits from gender-diverse boards. Furthermore, non-compliant companies face little pressure to change due to the small number of companies that have already adopted respective code recommendations. We identify two potential alternatives to boost the effectiveness of voluntary self-regulation for gender-diverse boards: First, the introduction of concrete targets for female representation and the public monitoring of fulfillment; and, second, the establishment of a credible threat that mandatory quotas will be imposed if diversity goals are not achieved. Drawing on longitudinal data from 2006 to 2016 on listed and state-owned companies in Austria, we give an empirical account of the conditions that assure effective self-regulation. Arguing that codes suffer from what we call 'opportunity bias', we conclude that political goals (such as gender equality) based on ethical rather than instrumental considerations are unlikely to be effectively implemented solely by codes of good governance.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 94%

The Carrot or the Stick: Self-Regulation for Gender-Diverse Boards via Codes of Good Governance

2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Even advanced western economies had to impose explicit rules on employers because the level of voluntary adoption toward more balanced boards was extremely slow. As argued by Thams et al (2018), state-level policies that promote gender parity have an important ripple effect on the attitudes, actions, and career aspirations of women by increasing the supply of better educated and more experienced women, which also increases the fraction of women serving on corporate boards. Hence, our study further speaks to the recent discussion on implementing gender quota requirements to allow Korean firms to capitalize on the benefits of female board participation and tap into a broader pool of business talent.…”

Section: Theoretical and Policy Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Female directors on the board and investment efficiency: evidence from Korea

et al. 2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We investigate whether female board representation affects investment efficiency at Korean publicly traded companies from 2006 to 2014. We find a positive association between female directorship and investment efficiency. For a subsample of firms that are classified into over-and under-investment groups, we find that the subsample of firms with female directors is less likely to over-invest compared to the group without female directors. This implies that female directors' risk-aversion, conservatism, and prudence affect investment efficiency by reducing over-investment rather than reducing under-investment. Other robustness tests corroborate our conclusion that female directors help to improve investment efficiency.

show abstract

“…In addition, Board of Commissioners seniority is defined as how long the board members served (Hamzah & Zulkafli, 2014). Further, women on Board of Commissioners is measured based on percentage of women on board (Thams et al, 2018). Finally, Board of Commissioners independence is measured by percentage of Board of Commissioners from outside (Rashid, 2018).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Lenard, Yu, York, & Wu, 2014), information asymmetry(Abad et al, 2017), management system(Ali & Konrad, 2017), corporate social responsibility(Muttakin, Khan, & Subramaniam, 2015), human and social capital(Ooi et al, 2017), firm performance(Darmadi, 2013), and gender policies(Thams, Bendell, & Terjesen, 2018). However, there is limited study that explore gender on Board of Commissioners and shareholder's wealth Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh (2009).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Board of Commissioners Involvement and Shareholder’s Wealth

2019

IJRTE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Using Continental European data on Indonesia, this research investigates the effect of Board of Commissioners involvement which is measured by responsibility, seniority, women participation and independency on shareholder’s wealth. This paper is the first research that examines the association between Board of Commissioners involvement and shareholder’s wealth based on 249 Indonesia listed companies. Panel data analysis was used to assess whether the Board of Commissioners responsibility and independency have positive effect on shareholder’s wealth. Based on the finding, seniority and women involvement have a negative relationship with shareholder’s wealth. These findings have practical implication, i.e. the shareholders should consider the Board of Commissioners involvement in appointing and dismissing them. Theoretically, these findings contributed to the agency theory in the way that the Board of Commissioners involvement could reduce the agency cost and increase the wealth of shareholders

show abstract

Explaining women's presence on corporate boards: The institutionalization of progressive gender-related policies

Cited by 69 publications

References 54 publications

The Carrot or the Stick: Self-Regulation for Gender-Diverse Boards via Codes of Good Governance

The Carrot or the Stick: Self-Regulation for Gender-Diverse Boards via Codes of Good Governance

Female directors on the board and investment efficiency: evidence from Korea

Board of Commissioners Involvement and Shareholder’s Wealth

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About