Explanation and causal reasoning: A contribution to the interpretation of competing explanatory claims

Abstract

The aim of this study is to attain a better understanding of the relationship between competing or complementary scientific explanatory claims. First, six different ways of approaching explanatory claims are briefly described and found, in part, to be unsatisfactory. It is argued that they should be supplemented by an analysis of underlying and sometimes partly unacknowledged causal presuppositions. This approach could be termed a causal analytical investigation, and in order to demonstrate its potential, it is applied to a concrete example: research into dental anxiety. The analysis shows that seemingly competing or complementary explanatory claims here neither compete with nor complement each other; instead, the analysis demonstrates that they explain different things. We then broaden the picture by discussing the relationship between aetiology and treatment. Finally we argue in favour of the general applicability of the approach and its relevance to science in general and to science-based practice.

Treatment of Dental Anxiety and Phobia—Diagnostic Criteria and Conceptual Model of Behavioural Treatment

“…Negative and traumatic experiences in the dental setting are the main causes, including poor communication and behaviour from dental staff but also a strong negative experience of pain related to dental treatment. Importantly, from a causal and treatment perspective, it is mainly the dental factors that we can target and alter specifically to reduce the level of dental anxiety to more normal levels and improve the related dental behaviour towards better and regular dental visiting habits [ 6 ]. From a causal perspective, personal and external factors cannot be produced or prevented in the dental setting, whereas the dental factors are accessible for prevention and treatment of dental anxiety [ 6 ].…”

Causation and reason: R. G. Collingwood and causal analysis as the essence of social thinking

“…Collingwood 1939, 118-9). I have earlier, but less extensively, discussed Collingwood's analysis of causation in Wide (2005) and, together with a colleague, in Wide and Wide Boman (2013). 7.…”

“…When it comes to the first kind of causation, there is of necessity a being-on-the same-level as regards the whole body of knowledge involved, and every party is, at least in principle, entitled and required to ask for further arguments when needed (cf. Wide and Wide Boman 2013;Habermas 1987). 29.…”

“…It could also, as will become evident, help solve, or at least throw some new light on a specific kind of scientific and meta-scientific controversy (cf. Wide and Wide Boman 2013) and, hopefully, even stimulate new approaches to old problems (e.g. the so-called agency/structure and mind/body problems).…”