Explanation and the poverty of pragmatics

Grimes, Thomas R.

doi:10.1007/bf00169712

Cited by 7 publications

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“…However, van Fraassen claims that favoring has to do with how well an answer 'shifts the mass of the probability function toward [the topic]' (van Fraassen [1980], p. 148). To my knowledge, Thomas Grimes ([1987]) is the first to offer the interpretation of the favoring relation that I use here. 19 Since E1 and E2 are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, P(E1) + P(E2) = 1, and P(E1|H1) + P(E2|H1) = 1.…”

Section: Bas Van Fraassen's Erotetic Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Which Models of Scientific Explanation Are (In)Compatible with Inference to the Best Explanation?

Prasetya¹

2024

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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In this article, I explore the compatibility of inference to the best explanation (IBE) with several influential models and accounts of scientific explanation. First, I explore the different conceptions of IBE and limit my discussion to two: the heuristic conception and the objective Bayesian conception. Next, I discuss five models of scientific explanation with regard to each model's compatibility with IBE. I argue that Philip Kitcher's unificationist account supports IBE; Peter Railton's deductivenomological-probabilistic model, Wesley Salmon's statistical-relevance Model, and Bas van Fraassen's erotetic account are incompatible with IBE; and Wesley Salmon's causal-mechanical model is merely consistent with IBE. In short, many influential models of scientific explanation do not support IBE. I end by outlining three possible conclusions to draw: (1) either philosophers of science or defenders of IBE have seriously misconstrued the concept of explanation, (2) philosophers of science and defenders of IBE do not use the term 'explanation' univocally, and (3) the ampliative conception of IBE, which is compatible with any model of scientific explanation, deserves a closer look.

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Section: Bas Van Fraassen's Erotetic Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Which Models of Scientific Explanation Are (In)Compatible with Inference to the Best Explanation?

Prasetya¹

2024

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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“…Arkansas State University NOTES 1. In Grimes (1987) I argue that by not restricting the type of interest that determines the relation of explanatory relevance, van Fraassen in effect avoids giving an account of this crucial relation as it applies to scientific explanation. Cf.…”

Section: IVmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explanatory Understanding and Contrastive Facts

GRIMES¹

1993

Philosophica

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“…29 29 Many other theorists who discuss van Fraassen's account of explanation level the same accusation. See, for example, Grimes (1987, 89), Hitchcock (1996, 399), and Sandborg (1998). …”

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confidence: 99%

How General Do Theories of Explanation Need To Be? *

Nickel

2010

Noûs

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Theories of explanation seek to tell us what distinctively explanatory information is. The most ambitious ones, such as the DN-account, seek to tell us what an explanation is, tout court. Less ambitious ones, such as causal theories, restrict themselves to a particular domain of inquiry. The least ambitious theories constitute outright skepticism, holding that there is no reasonably unified phenomenon to give an account of. On these views, it is impossible to give any theories of explanation at all. I argue that both the less ambitious and outright skeptical varieties are committed to a certain context-sensitivity of our explanatory discourse. And though this discourse is almost certainly context-sensitive in some respects, it does not exhibit the context-sensitivity less than fully ambitious theories are committed to. Therefore, all accounts that seek to restrict themselves in scope, including causal accounts of explanation, fail.

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Explanation and the poverty of pragmatics

Cited by 7 publications

References 3 publications

Which Models of Scientific Explanation Are (In)Compatible with Inference to the Best Explanation?

Which Models of Scientific Explanation Are (In)Compatible with Inference to the Best Explanation?

Explanatory Understanding and Contrastive Facts

How General Do Theories of Explanation Need To Be? *

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