Explicatures are NOT Cancellable

Capone, Alessandro

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-01014-4_5

Cited by 18 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Concerning point 3 (cancellability), Capone argues that one of the main obstacles to a modular view of inferential processes is removed once it is recognized that explicatures are not cancellable [a point discussed at length in Capone (2006Capone ( , 2009; see also Burton-Roberts' (2005) splendid paper]. The convergence between Capone's previous work on lack of cancellability of explicatures and modularity of mind is not a mere coincidence.…”

Section: Capone (2010b) On Pragmatics and Modularity Of Mindmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Furthermore, while potential implicatures and explicatures are usually cancellable, once intentions are fixed in context it will not do to cancel them. This is an idea which I expressed in Capone (2006Capone ( , 2009Capone ( , 2010b [but also see Burton-Roberts' (2005) important work] and which has been supported by Burton-Roberts (personal communication). So, I agree that the pragmatic process is permeable, but it is instantaneously permeable, and thus it is completely different from theory formation, which occurs without any time constraints.…”

Section: Louise Cummings Modularity and Pragmaticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Attributive/Referential Distinction, Pragmatics, Modularity of Mind and Modularization

Capone¹

2011

Australian Journal of Linguistics

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Section: Capone (2010b) On Pragmatics and Modularity Of Mindmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Louise Cummings Modularity and Pragmaticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Attributive/Referential Distinction, Pragmatics, Modularity of Mind and Modularization

Capone¹

2011

Australian Journal of Linguistics

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“…One thing should be understood from the start: the view that explicatures cannot be cancelled can be traced back to Capone ( 2003 , 2009 , 2013 , 2015 ) and has been taken up particularly by Burton-Roberts ( 2005 , 2010 , 2013 ). First and foremost, this view is based on two general objections to the cancellability of explicatures.…”

Section: Objections To Cancellable Explicaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

On explicatures, cancellability and cancellation

Walczak

2016

SpringerPlus

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Within the Gricean framework only what is conversationally implicated is cancellable, whereas what is conventionally implicated and what is said cannot be cancelled without giving rise to contradiction. In the relevance-theoretic framework, however, the question is whether explicatures, which replace the Gricean notion of what is said, are cancellable. In recent years, various objections to the cancellability of explicatures have been raised. The aim of the present paper is to demonstrate that these objections are due to a misinterpretation of the Gricean cancellability test. In particular, they disregard the fact that this test is merely one of several diagnostic tools that are used by Grice to distinguish between conventional and conversational implicatures. Once we have recognized the essence of the cancellability test, the objections to the cancellability of explicatures turn out to be unwarranted.

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“…I held this position in Capone (2006Capone ( , 2009 and forthcoming) for a number of reasons, both theoretical and empirical. In the present paper, I will take it as granted (or grant able) that in general explicatures cannot be cancelled (if they can be cancelled, they are either potential explicatures or, otherwise, merely conversational implicatures).…”

Section: Cancellability Of Intentionsmentioning

confidence: 99%