Exploiting Security Vulnerabilities in Intermittent Computing

Krishnan, Archanaa S.; Schaumont, Patrick

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-05072-6_7

Cited by 13 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Further, saving and subsequently retrieving state at code execution checkpoints for a long-run application via an intermittent execution model [16] is not only: i) costly in terms of computations and energy [17]-saving state in non-volatile memories such as FLASH or EEPROM consumes more energy than static RAM (SRAM) whilst reading state from FRAM consumes more energy than writing as we demonstrate in Fig. 5; but also: ii) render a device in a vulnerable state for an attacker to exploit when checkpoint state is stored on off-chip memory with an easily accessible memory bus [18]. These issues make the execution of long-run security algorithms, such as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) 1 key exchange, difficult to deploy securely.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Wisecr: Secure Simultaneous Code Disseminationto Many Batteryless Computational RFID Devices

Su¹,

Chesser²,

Gao³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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Emerging ultra-low-power tiny scale computing devices in Cyber-Physical Systems run on harvested energy, are intermittently powered, have limited computational capability, and perform sensing and actuation functions under the control of a dedicated firmware operating without the supervisory control of an operating system. Wirelessly updating or patching firmware of such devices is inevitable. We consider the challenging problem of simultaneous and secure firmware updates or patching for a typical class of such devices-Computational Radio Frequency Identification (CRFID) devices. We propose Wisecr, the first secure and simultaneous wireless code dissemination mechanism to multiple devices that prevents malicious code injection attacks and intellectual property (IP) theft, whilst enabling remote attestation of code installation. Importantly, Wisecr is engineered to comply with existing ISO compliant communication protocol standards employed by CRFID devices and systems. We comprehensively evaluate Wisecr's overhead, demonstrate its implementation over standards compliant protocols, analyze its security and implement an end-to-end realization with popular CFRID devices-the open-source code is released on GitHub.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Wisecr: Secure Simultaneous Code Disseminationto Many Batteryless Computational RFID Devices

Su¹,

Chesser²,

Gao³

et al. 2021

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Our attacker capabilities are reasoned based on [14], with following changes to consider more generic threats: 1) the duration of attacker's physical access is restricted; 2) an attack does not leave visible traces (e.g., modify the configuration or data) to avoid drawing a user's attention; 3) we obviated attacks that requires expert knowledge or expensive equipment.…”

Section: B Attacker Capabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, exploitation or what useful information the dumped firmware could provide, time and monetary cost of an attack or a practical adversary model extracting the firmware and the consequence of having access to that firmware was unclear. Krishnan and Schaumont, in [14] investigated exploiting the JTAG (Joint Test Action Group) interface in an intermittent computing system. They demonstrated the extraction of the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) secret key from checkpoints stored in on-chip NVM (non-volatile memory).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leaving Your Things Unattended is No Joke! Memory Bus Snooping and Open Debug Interface Exploits

Shao‐Horn¹,

Ranasinghe²

2022

Preprint

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Internet of Things devices are widely adopted by the general population. People today are more connected than ever before. The widespread use and low-cost driven construction of these devices in a competitive marketplace render Internetconnected devices an easier and attractive target for malicious actors. This paper demonstrates non-invasive physical attacks against IoT devices in two case studies in a tutorial style format. The study focuses on demonstrating the: i) exploitation of debug interfaces, often left open after manufacture; and ii) the exploitation of exposed memory buses. We illustrate a person could commit such attacks with entry-level knowledge, inexpensive equipment, and limited time (in 8 to 25 minutes).

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“…By regularly saving the run-time data into a device's non-volatile memory (NVM) [21]- [23] or uploading to a server after encryption [20] (i.e., the checkpoint), the system can resume from the last intact checkpoint whenever a power failure occurs. However, writing to NVM is energy intensive [20] and raises security concerns [20], [25]. Off-device checkpointing methods [20] requires coordination between the reader and the device, as well as time and energy overheads (e.g., for data transmissions and encryption functions).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

ReaDmE: Read-Rate Based Dynamic Execution Scheduling for Intermittent RF-Powered Devices

Ranasinghe

2021

Preprint

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This paper presents a method for remotely and dynamically determining the execution schedule of long-running tasks on intermittently powered devices such as computational RFID. Our objective is to prevent brown-out events caused by sudden power-loss due to the intermittent nature of the powering channel. We formulate, validate and demonstrate that the readrate measured from an RFID reader (number of successful interrogations per second) can provide an adequate means of estimating the powering channel condition for passively powered CRFID devices. This method is attractive because it can be implemented without imposing an added burden on the device or requiring additional hardware. We further propose ReaDmE, a dynamic execution scheduling scheme to mitigate brownout events to support long-run execution of complex tasks, such as cryptographic algorithms, on CRFID. Experimental results demonstrate that the ReaDmE method can improve CRFID's long-run execution success rate by 20% at the critical operational range or reduce time overhead by up to 23% compared to previous execution scheduling methods.

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Exploiting Security Vulnerabilities in Intermittent Computing

Cited by 13 publications

References 27 publications

Wisecr: Secure Simultaneous Code Disseminationto Many Batteryless Computational RFID Devices

Wisecr: Secure Simultaneous Code Disseminationto Many Batteryless Computational RFID Devices

Leaving Your Things Unattended is No Joke! Memory Bus Snooping and Open Debug Interface Exploits

ReaDmE: Read-Rate Based Dynamic Execution Scheduling for Intermittent RF-Powered Devices

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