Exploring the line between the preventive and punitive character of measures in the frame of a just culture

Perceptions of Just Culture Between Pilots and Managers

“…This latter perspective is supported by findings from previous research; the illusion of objectivity found by Dekker and Nyce (2013), and the finding that judgment on culpability is subjective (Liao, 2015) Also, human performance is variable; no substitution test can account for that. To address these concerns, both the literature and the outcomes of this research suggest that if a decision tree is used, a well-worked out process should include definitions of behaviors for context, a substitution test, a reasonability test, an effectiveness test, as well as reflection on the role the organization and management had in the incident (Hobbs, 2008; Hudson et al, 2008; Johnston, 1995; Karanikas & Chionis, 2017). Even though a decision tree can make the process transparent and offers a standard approach to look into an incident, users should be aware that the tool can still be entered in a biased state of mind.…”

“…He writes that this type of justice offers the illusion of objectivity and evidence and can even be biased and used as a way to legitimize injustice (Dekker & Nyce, 2013). This advance is supported by others who suggest that culpability tools can only be employed if concepts of culpability are negotiated within an organization beforehand (Cromie & Bott, 2016;Karanikas & Chionis, 2017). More limitations with the methods of determining culpability have been highlighted by other entities.…”

Procedural justice for all? Legitimacy, just culture and legal anxiety in European civil aviation

“…Scholarly literature has long addressed just culture in aviation and covers several fields of research: legal scholarship (Kaupat, 2013;Pellegrino, 2019;Schubert, 2004), sociolegal scholarship (Hodges, 2015;Hodges & Steinholtz, 2017;Woodlock & Hydén, 2020), and safety science (Dekker, 2007(Dekker, , 2009(Dekker, , 2017McMurtrie & Molesworth, 2018;Reason, 1997). Aircraft maintenancefocused just culture scholarship stems from these scholarly fields (Bükeç & Gerede, 2017;Cromie & Bott, 2016;Gerede, 2015aGerede, , 2015bKaranikas & Chionis, 2017).…”

“…The study concluded that there is a need for (global) exploration of the interaction between local, national, and just cultures concerning regulated SMS (Cromie & Bott, 2016, p. 272). Karanikas and Chionis' (2017) survey-based research explored military aviation employee perceptions of the punitive and preventative actions that management of a large aviation organization can take in the face of errors and violations (Karanikas & Chionis, 2017, p. 174). Although the employees shared the same nationality, statistically significant differences were observed across occupationally specialized groups (pilots, ATC staff, and technicians) regarding "the appropriateness of specific measures especially in the case of errors."…”

“…Through a comparative survey‐based study of European licensed aircraft maintenance engineers, “LAMEs,” (see Hampson et al, 2012) working as certifying staff in the commercial air transport (CAT) sector of Norway, Portugal, and Sweden, this article addresses these gaps and explores the relationship between occurrence reporting and just culture, both as EU regulated requirements and as applied policy in aircraft maintenance organizations operating in these countries. Drawing on Tylerian theory and related scholarship, which distinguishes between instrumental and normative perspectives of procedural justice and legitimacy, the research applies correlation and regression analysis to examine if certifying LAMEs working in these three countries experience occurrence reporting as procedurally just processes and if, by extension, these experiences enhance legitimacy perceptions of EU/EASA rules and levels of regulatory authority (Tyler, 2006a; see Karanikas & Chionis, 2017). To address if noncompliance with regulated reporting requirements is a continuing consequence of blame culture, the study examines if “legal anxiety” continues to instrumentally affect professionals' safety reporting behaviors (Langer & Braithwaite, 2016, p. 987; see Gerede, 2015a, 2015b).…”