Exploring the Moral Hazard Evolutionary Mechanism for BIM Implementation in an Integrated Project Team

Abstract

Integrated project delivery (IPD) is a new emerging delivery system, contributes to increase value to the owner, reduces waste and maximizes efficiency in the life cycle of projects. However, IPD system has not yet shifted from pilot-alike or particular-purposed cases to large-scale applications.The huge advantages of building information modeling (BIM) are far from being exploited, which directly leads to the delivered outcomes below expectations, thereby causing obstacles to widespread application of IPD system. The reasons impeding the successful application of BIM has been a hot topic. Previous studies suggested that moral hazard behavior is a critical inducer leading to the undesirable outcomes. However, very few studies have studied the evolution mechanism of moral hazard behavior for BIM application. To fill this knowledge gap, this study proposed a novel model, aiming to capture dynamically the interactive behavior of BIM-based strategy selections using evolutionary game theory. Five parameters of monitoring cost, proprietary cost, incentive payment, punishment and speculative benefit are extracted and defined in the proposed model. Numerical simulations are conducted with MATLAB 2016a. The simulation results showed that when incentive payment is higher than the sum of speculative benefit and proprietary cost, interactive behavior of both game players will move toward the optimal portfolio strategy. Incentive payment and punishment have negative correlations with the probability of moral hazard behavior for BIM application. Parameters of speculative benefit and proprietary cost affect positively implementation probability of moral hazard behavior of employing BIM. This study can provide theoretical and managerial implications for integrated project managers and related government department to improve implementation of BIM and IPD system, and also contribute to its sustainable development.

Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Subject Risk Management Behavior in Construction Stage of Engineering Project Based on Strong Reciprocity and Prospect Theory

“…Thus, the behavior selection process among engineering subjects belongs to an incomplete information game. Certain studies [11], [12], [14], [15], [19] and this study build the game model under incomplete information, thereby considering the uncertainty of each subject's behavior and decisions, which is more consistent with the actual situation of an engineering project. (2) In terms of rationality, [10], [11], [21] and [30] are based on the assumption that participants are completely rational.…”

“…Owing to differences in roles, abilities, and cognition, project subjects show evident characteristics of bounded rationality in the face of a complex environment. The studies [12], [14], [15], [19] and this study apply evolutionary game theory to analyze the game equilibrium process of the risk behaviors of participants with bounded rationality, making the problem research more practical.…”

“…(3) In terms of the application of prospect theory, [10], [11], [12], [14], [15], [19] and [30] do not analyze the impacts of decision-makers' psychological perceptions and risk preferences on their decision-making behaviors. Prospect theory can reasonably explain decision-makers' psychological perceptions and risk preferences in the face of profit and loss.…”

“…Li et al [12] explored the evolution mechanisms of public sector and private sector risk behaviors in cases of public participation in PPP projects, and showed that with an increase in public participation, the private sector was more likely to reduce risk behaviors. Zheng et al [13] and Du et al [14] studied the change mechanisms of stakeholders' moral hazard behaviors in the implementation of building information modeling based on evolutionary game theory. Zhu et al [15] analyzed the cooperative relationship between two types of contractors (prime contractor and subcontractor) in large projects, and studied the evolution trend of their risk behaviors in a green supply chain.…”

The Collective Strategies of Key Stakeholders in Sponge City Construction: A Tripartite Game Analysis of Governments, Developers, and Consumers

“…Some scholars use evolutionary game to study the collective strategies of the central government, local land administration, and land expropriated farmers in land expropriation [33]. This method can also be used to capture dynamically the interactive behavior of strategy selections based on building information modeling (BIM) [34]. It is also combined with the system dynamics to carry out the game and simulation research on the evolution of the quadripartite safety supervision system for high-speed railway companies and their agents [35].…”