Expressive Shareholder Democracy: A Multilevel Study of Shareholder Dissent in 15 Western European Countries

Sauerwald, Steve; Oosterhout, Hans van; Essen, Marc van

doi:10.1111/joms.12171

Cited by 28 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 140 publications

(208 reference statements)

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“…CEO duality is positively associated with a higher number of shareholders' dissent votes. Previous studies such as Conyon () and Sauerwald et al () have shown that CEO duality leads to more shareholders' dissent. In addition, the log of net sales has mixed results with shareholders' dissent votes.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…Although previous studies tend to show that shareholders vote with incumbent management (Armstrong, Gow, & Larcker, 2013;Conyon & Sadler, 2010;del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999;Listokin, 2010;Smith, 1996), a recent study by Sauerwald, Van Oosterhout, and Van Essen (2016) argues that shareholders' dissent can be viewed as an effective corporate governance mechanism even though it may not affect the voting outcome directly. According to some studies, shareholders are publicly making their views known with their dissent voting indicating that they are not satisfied with the present management and thereby leading to a negative evaluation of a firm's corporate governance (Hillman et al, 2011;Sauerwald et al, 2016). Previous studies identify several negative effects of dissenting shareholders on firm outcomes such as the decrease of firm value, the replacement of the CEO and of other board members, and even the takeover of the firm in the long term (for recent reviews, see Goranova & Ryan, 2014;Obermann & Velte, 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Moreover, voting gives the shareholders a means of conveying their disapproval on the proposed executive remuneration by voting against or abstaining (Goranova & Ryan, 2014). Although previous studies tend to show that shareholders vote with incumbent management (Armstrong, Gow, & Larcker, 2013;Conyon & Sadler, 2010;del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999;Listokin, 2010;Smith, 1996), a recent study by Sauerwald, Van Oosterhout, and Van Essen (2016) argues that shareholders' dissent can be viewed as an effective corporate governance mechanism even though it may not affect the voting outcome directly. According to some studies, shareholders are publicly making their views known with their dissent voting indicating that they are not satisfied with the present management and thereby leading to a negative evaluation of a firm's corporate governance (Hillman et al, 2011;Sauerwald et al, 2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Gender diversity and say‐on‐pay: Evidence from UK remuneration committees

Alkalbani¹,

Cuomo

Mallin

2019

Corporate Governance

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Research question/issue We examine whether the presence of women on the remuneration committee has an influence on say‐on‐pay voting. Research findings/insights Based on panel data from the UK's FTSE 350 firms from 2003 to 2015, we find that firms with women on the remuneration committee reduce shareholders' dissent via say‐on‐pay. However, only firms with a critical mass of more than 30% women on this committee are more likely to have less shareholders' dissent via say‐on‐pay (i.e., the presence of 30% women or less on this committee is not sufficient). Theoretical/academic implications Our results provide empirical evidence that the gender diversity of directors on the remuneration committee plays a significant role in shaping shareholders' dissent via say‐on‐pay in the United Kingdom. Our results also provide empirical support for some of the previous studies that draw on critical mass theory that imply that women are more effective monitors when they make up a critical mass of more than 30%. Practitioner/policy implications Our results could provide regulators with evidence in favor of improving women's representation on UK remuneration committees. In addition, our results could help shareholders and nomination committee members understand the importance of having women on UK remuneration committees, as they are more likely to avoid suboptimal pay and align directors' remuneration packages more closely with shareholders' expectations. Finally, our results could also attract the attention of main stakeholders and the media, especially given their increasing attention both to gender diversity and say‐on‐pay.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Gender diversity and say‐on‐pay: Evidence from UK remuneration committees

Alkalbani¹,

Cuomo

Mallin

2019

Corporate Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…A review of past empirical research allowed considering several control variables in this analysis. The board size (BODSIZE)—in line with Sauerwald, Van Oosterhout, and Van Essen () and De Andrés, Arranz‐Aperte, and Rodríguez‐Sanz ()—was calculated as the total number of directors on boards. The second control variable was company performance, proxied with Tobin's Q (García‐Ramos, Díaz‐Díaz, & García‐Olalla, ) and denoted by Q_TOBIN.…”

Section: Empirical Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Varieties of capitalism, corporate governance mechanisms, and stakeholder engagement: An overview of coordinated and liberal market economies

Pucheta‐Martínez

Gallego‐Álvarez

Bel‐Oms

2019

Corp Soc Responsibility Env

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This paper examines those aspects of national institutions that affect corporate governance mechanisms at international level. The study uses the “varieties of capitalism” approach, which is concerned with the way companies interact strategically to solve the coordination problems arising from their activities. This research is based on a sample of countries operating in coordinated market economies and liberal market economies. The data were collected from the Thomson Reuters database. The findings suggest that the institutional context is associated with several corporate governance mechanisms. Specifically, our results find that the proportion of female directors on boards and the presence of corporate governance committees are higher in firms operating in liberal market economies than in those domiciled in coordinated market economies. Regarding the disclosure of corporate social responsibility information, the evidence shows that it is not affected by the varieties of capitalism measured, whereas board‐specific skills are higher in the latter than in the former. This paper offers empirical evidence at international level for the varieties of capitalism that contribute to better corporate governance structures. With regard to managerial implications, our findings show that belonging (or not) to a specific variety of capitalism impacts various mechanisms of corporate governance.

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“…Along with Solomon (2017), Moriarty (2016) and Sauerwald et al (2016) we pose premise that the existence of liberty and freedom to share opinions are very important to enforce good governance among ISSN 1948-4658 2017 not-for-profits. Public opinion must be acknowledged as insights for future improvement.…”

Section: Exploring Organizational Democracymentioning

confidence: 99%

Are We on the Right Track? Inserting Democracy System unto Governance Mechanism for Not-For-Profit Organization

Prasetyo

2017

JCGR

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Research on good governance mechanism has been done tremendously for more than five decades but not for the not-for-profit sector. The concept is still inclusive and under theorized. Most study focus on adopting concept from commercial sector which is sometimes misleads. This paper tries to find clear evidence by inserting new variables namely democracy. The study begins by looking at the importance of stakeholder and brings in the idea of positioning the society in the organization. Using multiple case analyses in Indonesia, this paper found that types of democracy has a great influenced on how organization sets their governance mechanism. For those who are experiencing an indirect democracy system, democratic governance is the ideal form. Meanwhile for the direct system, compliance model would be the most ideal term. And finally for an active participatory system, the study suggests to use participatory governance model. Among those three, the last model shall be justified as the most ideal form of governance for the sector, thus leaving something for future agenda.

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Expressive Shareholder Democracy: A Multilevel Study of Shareholder Dissent in 15 Western European Countries

Cited by 28 publications

References 140 publications

Gender diversity and say‐on‐pay: Evidence from UK remuneration committees

Gender diversity and say‐on‐pay: Evidence from UK remuneration committees

Varieties of capitalism, corporate governance mechanisms, and stakeholder engagement: An overview of coordinated and liberal market economies

Are We on the Right Track? Inserting Democracy System unto Governance Mechanism for Not-For-Profit Organization

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