This study develops the concept of Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility (Strategic CSR) by meta‐analyzing the available empirical evidence on the relationship between CSR and corporate financial performance (CFP). Using meta‐analytic structural equation modeling on effect size data from 344 primary studies, our study documents four empirical mechanisms explaining how CSR positively affects CFP: by 1) enhancing firm reputation, 2) increasing stakeholder reciprocation, 3) mitigating firm risk, and 4) strengthening innovation capacity. We propose these four mechanisms to identify four causally relevant attributes that allow us to conceptually distinguish Strategic CSR from CSR more generally. Our findings indicate that the four mechanisms combined explain 20 per cent of the CSR‐CFP relationship, suggesting that considerable room remains for future empirical research. The development of an empirically informed, causal conceptualization of Strategic CSR responds to a long‐heard call for better‐specified concepts in empirical CSR research.

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This study develops an expressive understanding of shareholder dissent. In this view, shareholder dissent is not only about the voting outcomes of proposals put to the vote, but also expresses an evaluation of the firm's corporate governance set-up. We hypothesize that shareholder dissent expresses an agency theoretical evaluation of corporate governance, but that the degree to which the capitalist system of a country is a coordinated market economy (CME) leads shareholders to evaluate corporate governance more in team production terms. We test our theoretical model using multilevel techniques on a sample of 12,513 proposals voted on in 717 firms listed in 15 Western European countries and find support for our predictions. Our study not only contributes to a better understanding of the corporate governance role of shareholder dissent, but also shows that what shareholders express through dissent differs across national contexts.

Are governance practices employed by professional service firms equally effective in preventing professional-client misconduct for professionals at different stages of their career? Drawing upon professional-agency theory and the literature documenting professional career patterns, we develop a multilevel theoretical model to answer this question. We test our model in the empirical context of the Dutch legal profession, using firm-level survey data on 142 law firms and individual-level archival data from the 2994 lawyers working for these firms to explain 97 formally adjudicated complaints of professional-client misconduct committed by individual lawyers registered with the Amsterdam Bar Association. We find that the ‘orthodox’ distinction between informal behavioral and formal outcome-based governance practices is too course-grained to receive empirical support, and that firm-level governance practices only reduce professional-client misconduct when they are specifically targeted at the career stage of the lawyers employed. Our findings not only allow us to develop a finer-grained version of Sharma’s professional-agency model, but may also be practically useful in developing firm-level governance practices targeted at different strata of professionals.

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate how concentrated owners add value to Asian firms. While prior research suggests that relational owners (i.e., business groups, top management team, board, government, banks, families, and corporation) may help firms fill institutional voids, this study proposes that it is transactional owners (i.e., foreign and institutional investors) lacking this ability who contribute most to firm performance. As these owners frequently hail from contexts with well-developed corporate governance traditions, they tend to have experience with the design and implementation of such governance practices. Design/methodology/approach This study involves a meta-analysis covering 276 studies from 17 Asian countries. Findings This study shows that transactional owners impose effective governance practices such as separating the chief executive officer (CEO) and Chair roles and assuring board independence. These practices promote decisions benefiting all shareholders, such as preventing diversification and financial over-leveraging. Originality/value This study contributes to the comparative corporate governance literature by showing that implementing internal governance practices helps improve firm performance in Asia. It also contributes to the owner identity literature by opening the black box of how transactional and relational owners differentially affect firms’ strategic behavior. Overall, this study yields a more nuanced understanding of what transactional owners contribute to Asian firms.