External Variables, Institutional Structure &amp; Dissent on State Supreme Courts

Canon, Bradley C.; Jaros, Dean

doi:10.2307/3233984

Cited by 36 publications

(23 citation statements)

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“…Environments characterized by socioeconomic and political complexity are believed to penetrate courts, causing them to be more divisive. Levels of expenditures by state governments, partisan competition and urbanism have been identified as important dimensions of environmental complexity (Canon and Jaros 1970;Jaros and Canon 1971;Glick and Vines 1973;Glick and Pruet 1986;Brace and Hall 1990). …”

Section: Environmental Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Studying Courts Comparatively: The View from the American States

Brace

Hall

1995

Political Research Quarterly

103

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In this study, we perform a basic exercise to illustrate the vital influence of institutional rules and structures on judicial behavior, and the impor tance of recognizing this influence in models of judicial choice. Specifically, we estimate several models of state supreme court justices' voting on the death penalty. Beginning with a simple preferences model, an institutional model, and an additive preferences-institutional model, we explore the extent to which our understanding of judicial behavior is enhanced or changed through models that include the interactive effects of institutional features with other sources of influence on judicial choice. Our most fundamental point, clearly supported by the results, is that the effects of case facts, per sonal attributes, and environmental features are conditioned by institutional arrangements. Any explanation of judicial choice must consider carefully the impact of institutional context on the exercise of judicial discretion. Through this approach, the inconsistencies among findings and theory in the judicial behavior literature can be reconciled, and a general theory of judicial choice can be developed.

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Section: Environmental Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Studying Courts Comparatively: The View from the American States

Brace

Hall

1995

Political Research Quarterly

103

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“…Scholars include this variable in almost all models of state court decisions out of the belief that appellate tribunals "siphon off routine cases" (Gryski, Main, and Dixon 1986, p. 145), leaving the more serious matters for courts of last resort to resolve. In the context of our study, the presence of these courts thus should increase the likelihood of the court applying a higher standard of review, as well as finding in favor of the party alleging discrimination, "since frivolous appeals will be screened by the intermediate appellate courts, and the high courts will be evaluating only the more serious claims of sex discrimination" (Gryski, Main, and Dixon 1986, p. 145; see also Atkins and Glick 1976;Canon and Jaros 1970).…”

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confidence: 99%

Does the U.S. Constitution Need an Equal Rights Amendment?

Baldez

Epstein

Martin³

2006

The Journal of Legal Studies

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For over 3 decades, those engaged in the battle over the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), along with many scholarly commentators, have argued that ratification of the amendment will lead U.S. courts (1) to elevate the standard of law they now use to adjudicate claims of sex discrimination, which, in turn, could lead them (2) to find in favor of parties claiming a denial of their rights. We investigate both possibilities via an examination of constitutional sex discrimination litigation in the 50 states-over a third of which have adopted ERAs.Employing methods especially developed for this investigation, we find no direct effect of the ERA on case outcomes. But we do identify an indirect effect: the presence of an ERA significantly increases the likelihood of a court applying a higher standard of law, which in turn significantly increases the likelihood of a decision favoring the equality claim.

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“…Whereas riskaverse decision makers tend to engage in consensual behavior (Cox & Tutt, 1984;Weingast, 1979), risk-takers prefer competitive bargaining that yields smaller coalitions (Riker & Ordeshook, 1973). Second, elections produce courts with more heterogeneous members who are responsive to a variety of perceived constituency appeals, and this heterogeneity encourages dissent (Canon & Jaros, 1970). Finally, elections "continually reactivate and reinforce partisan attachments that would otherwise become less important in the daily work of justices"; even nonpartisan elections may "reinforce existing divisions on the court" (Leonard & Ross, 2014, p. 8).…”

Section: Member Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Discouraging Dissent

Hall

Windett

2016

American Politics Research

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Chief judges often strive to promote consensus in their courts to promote public confidence, durable precedents, and intracourt collegiality; yet, some chiefs succeed, whereas others fail. In this article, we identify institutional factors that facilitate and hinder the chief's ability to promote consensus by examining dissent rates in every state court of last resort from 1995 to 2004. Consistent with prior work, we find that consensus is partially driven by the chief judge's formal powers and the institutional resources available to court members. However, we also find that member resources moderate the chief's influence. The chief's formal powers are associated with lower dissent rates in courts that lack time, staff, docket control, and insulation from the electorate. In contrast, judges who possess greater resources are highly resistant to the chief's influence. Our findings suggest a fundamental dynamic of political leadership that may operate across institutional contexts.

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External Variables, Institutional Structure & Dissent on State Supreme Courts

Cited by 36 publications

References 0 publications

Studying Courts Comparatively: The View from the American States

Studying Courts Comparatively: The View from the American States

Does the U.S. Constitution Need an Equal Rights Amendment?

Discouraging Dissent

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