Fair and Efficient Social Choice in Dynamic Settings

Freeman, Rupert; Zahedi, Seyed Majid; Conitzer, Vincent

doi:10.24963/ijcai.2017/639

Cited by 37 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Further, we study the offline problem in which we are presented with the entire problem up front, and need to choose the outcomes on all issues simultaneously. One can also define an online version of the problem [19], in which we must commit to the outcome of issue t before observing issues t ′ with t ′ > t for all t, but we do not consider that version here.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When the weights are reduced enough so that a player in DEC is about to lose a good to a player, necessarily outside DEC (Lines 9-11), the latter player is added to DEC (Line 12) before proceeding further. When a player who has less than p goods is added to DEC, this process stops and the algorithm leverages the set of ties it created along the way to make the aforementioned alteration to the allocation (Lines [16][17][18][19][20][21].…”

Section: Exact Triple-cover By 3-sets (X33c)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Because the outer loop (Lines 3-22) explicitly runs until each player receives at least p goods, we simply need to prove that the loop terminates. For this, we need to analyze the first inner loop (Lines 8-14) and the second inner loop (Lines [16][17][18][19][20][21].…”

Section: Proof Of Theorem 14mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Fair Public Decision Making

Conitzer

Freeman

Shah

2017

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

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116

144

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We generalize the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to the problem of fair public decision making, in which a decision must be made on several social issues simultaneously, and, unlike the classic setting, a decision can provide positive utility to multiple players. We extend the popular fairness notion of proportionality (which is not guaranteeable) to our more general setting, and introduce three novel relaxations -proportionality up to one issue, round robin share, and pessimistic proportional share -that are also interesting in the classic goods allocation setting. We show that the Maximum Nash Welfare solution, which is known to satisfy appealing fairness properties in the classic setting, satisfies or approximates all three relaxations in our framework. We also provide polynomial time algorithms and hardness results for finding allocations satisfying these axioms, with or without insisting on Pareto optimality.

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Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Exact Triple-cover By 3-sets (X33c)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fair Public Decision Making

Conitzer

Freeman

Shah

2017

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

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116

144

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“…Since then it has received significant attention in the literature on social choice and fair division (see, e.g. [13,20,45,29] for a subset of notable recent work, and the references therein).…”

Section: Relatedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Budget-Additive Valuations

Garg¹,

Hoefer²,

Mehlhorn³

2018

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

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We present the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for maximizing the Nash social welfare when allocating indivisible items to agents with budget-additive valuation functions. Budget-additive valuations represent an important class of submodular functions. They have attracted a lot of research interest in recent years due to many interesting applications. For every ε > 0, our algorithm obtains a (2.404 + ε)-approximation in time polynomial in the input size and 1/ε.Our algorithm relies on rounding an approximate equilibrium in a linear Fisher market where sellers have earning limits (upper bounds on the amount of money they want to earn) and buyers have utility limits (upper bounds on the amount of utility they want to achieve). In contrast to markets with either earning or utility limits, these markets have not been studied before. They turn out to have fundamentally different properties.Although the existence of equilibria is not guaranteed, we show that the market instances arising from the Nash social welfare problem always have an equilibrium. Further, we show that the set of equilibria is not convex, answering a question of [17]. We design an FPTAS to compute an approximate equilibrium, a result that may be of independent interest.

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“…We show that minimizing this product is tractable and guerantees Pareto efficiency. Moreover, this product is monotone in each agent's valuation and it satisfies scale invariance (if an agent doubles all her valuations this does not change which outcomes maximize the objective) [19]. By comparison, we also study the minimum disvaluation in an allocation.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Group Envy Freeness and Group Pareto Efficiency in Fair Division with Indivisible Items

Aleksandrov

Walsh

2018

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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We consider two models of fair division with indivisible items: one for goods and one for bads. For goods, we study two generalized envy freeness proxies (EF1 and EFX for goods) and three common welfare (utilitarian, egalitarian and Nash) efficiency notions. For bads, we study two generalized envy freeness proxies (1EF and XEF for goods) and two less common diswelfare (egalitarian and Nash) efficiency notions. Some existing algorithms for goods do not work for bads. We thus propose several new algorithms for the model with bads. Our new algorithms exhibit many nice properties. For example, with additive identical valuations, an allocation that maximizes the egalitarian diswelfare or Nash diswelfare is XEF and PE. Finally, we also give simple and tractable cases when these envy freeness proxies and welfare efficiency are attainable in combination (e.g. 0/1 valuations, 0/ − 1 valuations, house allocations).

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Fair and Efficient Social Choice in Dynamic Settings

Cited by 37 publications

References 4 publications

Fair Public Decision Making

Fair Public Decision Making

Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Budget-Additive Valuations

Group Envy Freeness and Group Pareto Efficiency in Fair Division with Indivisible Items

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