2018
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.02.006
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Fair solutions to the random assignment problem

Abstract: We study the problem of assigning indivisible goods to individuals where each is to receive one good. To guarantee fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments that individuals evaluate according to first order stochastic dominance (sd). In particular, we find that solutions which guarantee sd-no-envy (e.g. the Probabilistic Serial) are incompatible even with the weak sd-core from equal division. Solutions on the other hand that produce assignments in the strong sd-core from… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1

Citation Types

0
2
0

Year Published

2018
2018
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
4
1

Relationship

1
4

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 5 publications
(2 citation statements)
references
References 21 publications
0
2
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Subsequently, the literature considered various generalizations of the model and/or applications of TTC: the case of no ownership [36,67,65], the case where some agents may own nothing (generalizing the two previous cases) [2,63,65,49,53], fairer probabilistic rules [1,8,6,11,15,16,22,21,23,35,41] allowing for indifferences in preferences [4,9,14,37,52,54,56,64], School Choice [3,29,48,28,47,46], and dynamic environments [40,58]. Several authors considered manipulation not by preference misreport but by the merging/splitting/withholding of endowments [7,18].…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Subsequently, the literature considered various generalizations of the model and/or applications of TTC: the case of no ownership [36,67,65], the case where some agents may own nothing (generalizing the two previous cases) [2,63,65,49,53], fairer probabilistic rules [1,8,6,11,15,16,22,21,23,35,41] allowing for indifferences in preferences [4,9,14,37,52,54,56,64], School Choice [3,29,48,28,47,46], and dynamic environments [40,58]. Several authors considered manipulation not by preference misreport but by the merging/splitting/withholding of endowments [7,18].…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…See for example,Basteck [2018] for an extensive analysis of logical relationships between various fairness concepts in the present context.23 Loosely speaking, this means that agents cannot change to "too much" the random assignments of other agents (in terms of probability shares) as the market becomes large.24 RSD is regular, provided the number of copies for each object type grows at the same rate as the number of agents, e.g., in replica economies.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%