2011
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1894569
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Fair Value Gains and Losses in Derivatives and CEO Compensation

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Cited by 7 publications
(13 citation statements)
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“…Larger values of VIX indicate higher market volatility. Like prior studies (e.g., Manchiraju, Hamlen, Kross, & Suk, and Manchiraju, Pierce, & Sridharan, ), we measured hedge ineffectiveness (HG_INE) as the ratio of derivative gains or losses due to hedging ineffectiveness to total assets.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Larger values of VIX indicate higher market volatility. Like prior studies (e.g., Manchiraju, Hamlen, Kross, & Suk, and Manchiraju, Pierce, & Sridharan, ), we measured hedge ineffectiveness (HG_INE) as the ratio of derivative gains or losses due to hedging ineffectiveness to total assets.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Ahmed et al (1999) document that earnings management is used as a method for firms to signal the good quality of their business to financial statements users. The effect of reporting choices on compensation has also been the focus of many studies, such as Healy (1985) and Healy and Wahlen (1999), and more recently, the relationship between compensation and fair value estimates (Manchiraju et al , 2016). Other indirect incentives for managers to smooth earnings include costs associated with risk aversion, breach of debt covenants and tax payments (Moyer, 1990; Scholes et al , 1990; Collins et al , 1995; Beatty et al , 1995; Dechow et al , 2010).…”
Section: Literature Review and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The implicit rationale for why managers choose these strategies is the effect on their own compensation. A more explicit linking of fair value estimates to compensation is provided in the study of Manchiraju et al (2016). Many of these studies further assume that managers’ acting to maximize compensation has negative consequences for investors[2].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The article shows that the new standard reduced idiosyncratic stock volatility suggesting that the model-based estimates provided better information to investors than the original historical cost approach. Manchiraju, Hamlen, Kross, and Suk (2016) provide at least a partially contradictory viewpoint by showing that at least in the Oil and Gas industry, CEO compensation increased from profits generated both by effective hedges and speculative hedges. They infer that compensation committees are unable to—fully—grasp the nature of these instruments although this failure is mitigated if there is an accounting expert on the compensation committee.…”
Section: Research On Fair Value: What Do We Know?mentioning
confidence: 99%