Fairness in Bargaining and Markets

Korth, Christian

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-02253-1

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…A CE differs substantially from the fairness equilibrium of Rabin [47] for two players and from other notions of fairness in Korth [48]. However,…”

Section: Compromise Scalar Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 77%

Normative Utility Models for Pareto Scalar Equilibria in n-Person, Semi-Cooperative Games in Strategic Form

Corley¹

2017

TEL

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Semi-cooperative games in strategic form are considered in which either a negotiation among the n players determines their actions or else an arbitrator specifies them. Methods are presented for selecting such action profiles by using multiple-objective optimization techniques. In particular, a scalar equilibrium (SE) is an action profile for the n players that maximize a utility function over the acceptable joint actions. Thus the selection of "solutions" to the game involves the selection of an acceptable utility function. In a greedy SE, the goal is to assign individual actions giving each player the largest payoff jointly possible. In a compromise SE, the goal is to make individual player payoffs equitable, while a satisficing SE achieves a target payoff level while weighting each player for possible additional payoff. These SEs are formally defined and shown to be Pareto optimal over the acceptable joint actions of the players. The advantage of these SEs is that they involve only pure strategies that are easily computed. Examples are given, including some well-known coordination games, and the worst-case time complexity for obtaining these SEs is shown to be linear in the number of individual payoffs in the payoff matrix. Finally, the SEs of this paper are checked against some standard game-theoretic bargaining axioms.

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“…A CE differs substantially from the fairness equilibrium of Rabin [47] for two players and from other notions of fairness in Korth [48]. However,…”

Section: Compromise Scalar Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 77%

Normative Utility Models for Pareto Scalar Equilibria in n-Person, Semi-Cooperative Games in Strategic Form

Corley¹

2017

TEL

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“…A CE, however, differs substantially from the Rabin's fairness equilibrium [12] for two players and from other notions of fairness as presented in [13].…”

Section: Compromise Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 96%

A Scalar Compromise Equilibrium for N-Person Prescriptive Games

Corley¹,

Charoensri²,

Engsuwan³

2014

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A scalar equilibrium (SE) is defined for n-person prescriptive games in normal form. When a decision criterion (notion of rationality) is either agreed upon by the players or prescribed by an external arbiter, the resulting decision process is modeled by a suitable scalar transformation (utility function). Each n-tuple of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities is transformed into a nonnegative scalar value between 0 and 1. Any n-tuple yielding a largest scalar value determines an SE, which is always a pure strategy profile. SEs can be computed much faster than Nash equilibria, for example; and the decision criterion need not be based on the players' selfishness. To illustrate the SE, we define a compromise equilibrium, establish its Pareto optimality, and present examples comparing it to other solution concepts.

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“…Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) overcome the limitations of a two-agent, static game and the complete information hypothesis in the Rabin model, and extend it to a situation closer to reality [61]. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) increase the variables of the model to describe the reciprocal altruistic motivation of the subject, and apply it to the asymmetric game model [62]; we later compare the model of Korth (2009) with the Rabin model, and determine that the equilibrium result of the former is more consistent with the reality [63].…”

Section: Reciprocal Altruistic Preferencementioning

confidence: 98%

A Game Analysis of Farmland Expropriation Conflict in China under Multi-Dimensional Preference: Cooperation or Resistance?

Hong

Zou

Zhu

et al. 2021

Land

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The process of urbanization in China has been accompanied by the conflict of land expropriation, which is not conducive to social stability. Different from the previous angles and methods of studying the conflict of agricultural land expropriation, this study puts forward a new behavioral perspective on the basis of game theory, and constructs an evolutionary game model of the conflict of agricultural land expropriation in China from the perspective of multi-dimensional preference. It also discusses the impact of different preference combinations on the conflict input, net income and utility of various stakeholders in agricultural land expropriation. The results show that under the influence of complete self-interest preference, the degree of protection of farmers’ land rights and interests affects the probability of conflicts in compensation for agricultural land expropriation. However, under the influence of multi-dimensional preference combination, agricultural land expropriation can be carried out smoothly only when the reciprocal altruism preference of local government and farmers is strong and the loss aversion preference is weak. These insights have implications for the sustainable development of land, including government involvement and farmers participation, particularly in the context of developing countries.

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Fairness in Bargaining and Markets

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

Normative Utility Models for Pareto Scalar Equilibria in n-Person, Semi-Cooperative Games in Strategic Form

Normative Utility Models for Pareto Scalar Equilibria in n-Person, Semi-Cooperative Games in Strategic Form

A Scalar Compromise Equilibrium for N-Person Prescriptive Games

A Game Analysis of Farmland Expropriation Conflict in China under Multi-Dimensional Preference: Cooperation or Resistance?

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