Fairness in Temporal Slot Assignment

Elkind, Edith; Kraiczy, Sonja; Teh, Nicholas

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_28

Cited by 3 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…While one can view this variant of the model as a temporal extension of single-winner elections, the multiwinner interpretation is justified, too, as one can treat the (multi-)set O = {o r : r ∈ [ℓ]} as the winning committee and apply fairness concepts that originate in multiwinner voting literature to the entire set O; e.g., Bulteau et al (2021) and Page, Shapiro, and Talmon (2022) reason about justified representation provided by O. This model is considered in numerous existing works, including scheduling problems (Elkind, Kraiczy, and Teh 2022;Patro et al 2022), perpetual voting (Lackner 2020;, and public decision-making (Conitzer, Freeman, and Shah 2017;Fain, Munagala, and Shah 2018). The second model assumes that the goal is to select a fixed-size set of winning candidates (i.e., an entire committee) at each timestep.…”

Section: Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

“…that each project in P can be implemented at most once, so if we select p ∈ P at timestep r, it is no longer available at r ′ ̸ = r (Elkind, Kraiczy, and Teh 2022;Patro et al 2022). More generally, for each project p ∈ P there may be a bound α p ∈ N, indicating the maximum number of times that p can be selected.…”

Section: Feasibility Constraintsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Relatedly, Harrenstein, Lackner, and Lackner (2022) argue that several common sequential election mechanisms may be detrimental to welfare. Another relevant strand of work is that on conference scheduling (Patro et al 2022), slot assignment (Elkind, Kraiczy, and Teh 2022), and line-up elections (Boehmer et al 2020), where the goal is to output a sequence of non-repeating winners, whilst maintaining fairness to voters across the entire time horizon. Sequential committee election models consider settings where an entire committee is elected in each round, and impose constraints on the extent a committee can change, whilst ensuring candidates continue to have support from the electorate (Bredereck, Kaczmarczyk, and Niedermeier 2020;Bredereck, Fluschnik, and Kaczmarczyk 2022;Deltl, Fluschnik, and Bredereck 2023).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting

Elkind,

Obraztsova,

Teh

2024

AAAI

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Multiwinner voting captures a wide variety of settings, from parliamentary elections in democratic systems to product placement in online shopping platforms. There is a large body of work dealing with axiomatic characterizations, computational complexity, and algorithmic analysis of multiwinner voting rules. Although many challenges remain, significant progress has been made in showing existence of fair and representative outcomes as well as efficient algorithmic solutions for many commonly studied settings. However, much of this work focuses on single-shot elections, even though in numerous real-world settings elections are held periodically and repeatedly. Hence, it is imperative to extend the study of multiwinner voting to temporal settings. Recently, there have been several efforts to address this challenge. However, these works are difficult to compare, as they model multi-period voting in very different ways. We propose a unified framework for studying temporal fairness in this domain, drawing connections with various existing bodies of work, and consolidating them within a general framework. We also identify gaps in existing literature, outline multiple opportunities for future work, and put forward a vision for the future of multiwinner voting in temporal settings.

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Section: Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Feasibility Constraintsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting

Elkind,

Obraztsova,

Teh

2024

AAAI

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“…Bulteau et al (2021) subsequently looked into formalizing notions of proportionate representation in this context. This framework also captures several other scenarios, including fair scheduling (Elkind, Kraiczy, and Teh 2022).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Welfare Maximization in Perpetual Voting (Student Abstract)

Neoh,

Teh

2024

AAAI

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We study the computational problems associated with maximizing various welfare objectives—namely utilitarian welfare, egalitarian welfare, and Nash welfare—in perpetual voting, a sequential collective decision-making framework. Prior work look into notions of fairness over time and study extensions of single-round voting rules to the multi-round setting. We show that while a utilitarian-welfare maximizing outcome can be computed efficiently, an outcome that maximizes egalitarian or Nash welfare is computationally intractable, even in the case of two candidates. We complement this by showing that maximizing egalitarian welfare is fixed-parameter tractable in the number of agents, and maximizing egalitarian or Nash welfare is W[2]-hard and slicewise polynomial in the number of timesteps. We also provide an approximation algorithm for maximizing egalitarian welfare and study strategyproofness with respect to these welfare objectives. Finally, we show that a simple greedy algorithm can achieve approximate proportionality in this setting.

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“…The tension between individual and group fairness exists in a variety of allocation scenarios studied in the literature; for example, when allocating public resources (such as housing, slots in public schools, or scheduling problems in general) Sönmez, 1998, 2003;Abdulkadiroglu et al, 2005a,b;Pathak, 2011;Benabbou et al, 2018;Elkind et al, 2022) -it is important to maintain fairness towards individual recipients, as well as groups (such as ethnic or socioeconomic groups). Another example is the allocation of reviewers (who, in this metaphor, are the goods) to papers (Charlin and Zemel, 2013;Stelmakh et al, 2019), it is important to balance the individual papers' satisfaction with their allotted reviewers, and the overall quality of reviewers assigned to tracks (e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

For One and All: Individual and Group Fairness in the Allocation of Indivisible Goods

Scarlett¹,

Teh²,

Zick³

2023

Preprint

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Fair allocation of indivisible goods is a well-explored problem. Traditionally, research focused on individual fairness -are individual agents satisfied with their allotted share? -and group fairness -are groups of agents treated fairly? In this paper, we explore the coexistence of individual envy-freeness (i-EF) and its group counterpart, group weighted envy-freeness (g-WEF), in the allocation of indivisible goods. We propose several polynomial-time algorithms that provably achieve i-EF and g-WEF simultaneously in various degrees of approximation under three different conditions on the agents' (i) when agents have identical additive valuation functions, i-EFX and g-WEF1 can be achieved simultaneously; (ii) when agents within a group share a common valuation function, an allocation satisfying both i-EF1 and g-WEF1 exists; and (iii) when agents' valuations for goods within a group differ, we show that while maintaining i-EF1, we can achieve a 1 3 -approximation to ex-ante g-WEF1. Our results thus provide a first step towards connecting individual and group fairness in the allocation of indivisible goods, in hopes of its useful application to domains requiring the reconciliation of diversity with individual demands.

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Fairness in Temporal Slot Assignment

Cited by 3 publications

References 23 publications

Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting

Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting

Welfare Maximization in Perpetual Voting (Student Abstract)

For One and All: Individual and Group Fairness in the Allocation of Indivisible Goods

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