False Memories: The Role of Plausibility and Autobiographical Belief

The degree of disparateness of event details modulates future simulation construction, plausibility, and recall

“…This idea is supported by a number of findings that real events are typically associated with greater sensory and perceptual detail than imagined future events (e.g., Addis et al, 2009; D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Weiler, Suchan, & Daum, 2011). From the perspective of the availability heuristic , on the other hand, the fluency with which the event is imagined influences plausibility estimations (Bernstein, Godfrey, & Loftus, 2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Whittlesea & Leboe, 2003). Thus an unexpected fluency of imagining for a novel event may lead individuals to mistake this fluency for familiarity with the event, thus inflating the belief that the event (or part of the event) is present in episodic memory, resulting in a higher plausibility rating (Bernstein et al, 2009).…”

“…From the perspective of the availability heuristic , on the other hand, the fluency with which the event is imagined influences plausibility estimations (Bernstein, Godfrey, & Loftus, 2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Whittlesea & Leboe, 2003). Thus an unexpected fluency of imagining for a novel event may lead individuals to mistake this fluency for familiarity with the event, thus inflating the belief that the event (or part of the event) is present in episodic memory, resulting in a higher plausibility rating (Bernstein et al, 2009). This idea is consistent with the suggestions that a crucial difference between imagined future events and recalled real past event lies in the effort that is required to construct them (Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; McDonough & Gallo, 2010).…”

Nonprobative photos rapidly lead people to believe claims about their own (and other people’s) pasts

“…What is more, research has shown that people draw on feelings of ease to make judgments about other people's pasts: BEase^makes people more confident that childhood experiences have happened to them and to other people (Bernstein, Godfrey, & Loftus, 2009;Bernstein, Whittlesea, & Loftus, 2002). Therefore, if photos operate by making it easier to bring related thoughts and images to mind, people should draw on those feelings as evidence even when their task is to evaluate other people's pasts, instead of their own.…”

The degree of disparateness of event details modulates future simulation construction, plausibility, and recall

“…This idea is supported by a number of findings that real events are typically associated with greater sensory and perceptual detail than imagined future events (e.g., Addis et al, 2009;D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004;Weiler, Suchan, & Daum, 2011). From the perspective of the availability heuristic, on the other hand, the fluency with which the event is imagined influences plausibility estimations (Bernstein, Godfrey, & Loftus, 2009;Tversky & Kahneman, 1973;Whittlesea & Leboe, 2003). Thus an unexpected fluency of imagining for a novel event may lead individuals to mistake this fluency for familiarity with the event, thus inflating the belief that the event (or part of the event) is present in episodic memory, resulting in a higher plausibility rating (Bernstein et al, 2009).…”

“…From the perspective of the availability heuristic, on the other hand, the fluency with which the event is imagined influences plausibility estimations (Bernstein, Godfrey, & Loftus, 2009;Tversky & Kahneman, 1973;Whittlesea & Leboe, 2003). Thus an unexpected fluency of imagining for a novel event may lead individuals to mistake this fluency for familiarity with the event, thus inflating the belief that the event (or part of the event) is present in episodic memory, resulting in a higher plausibility rating (Bernstein et al, 2009). This idea is consistent with the suggestions that a crucial difference between imagined future events and recalled real past event lies in the effort that is required to construct them (Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007;McDonough & Gallo, 2010).…”