Familienbildung und familiale Entscheidungsfindung aus verhandlungstheoretischer Sicht

Ott, Notburga

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-83989-4_7

Cited by 39 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Furthermore, we cannot assume that an internal consensus exists a priori, as the household utility maximisation model implies. For this to be the case, the costs and benefits of having children would have to be the same for both partners (Ott 1989a). Auspurg and Abraham (2007) showed that in a heterosexual relationship, both the man and the woman differentiate between their own and their partner's benefits.…”

Section: Theoretical Considerations Regarding the Fertility Decision-mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These studies are based on the bargaining model suggested by Ott (1989aOtt ( , b, 1992Ott ( , 1995Ott ( , 2001. In this research the decision to become a parent is discussed as a central theme within the context of the allocation of responsibilities within the partnership, taking into account the individual cost-benefit analysis of both of the partners.…”

Section: Theoretical Considerations Regarding the Fertility Decision-mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the other hand, a woman may scale back her career ambitions when she starts a family. Hence, the decision to become a parent often leads to an impairment of the woman's negotiating position (Ott 1989a). …”

Section: Theoretical Considerations Regarding the Fertility Decision-mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Couples' fertility decision-making

Stein¹,

Willen²,

Pavetic³

2014

DemRes

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Section: Theoretical Considerations Regarding the Fertility Decision-mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theoretical Considerations Regarding the Fertility Decision-mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Couples' fertility decision-making

Stein¹,

Willen²,

Pavetic³

2014

DemRes

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“…In Mincer's model, family migration will only occur if, in the process of welfare maximisation at the household level, the gains realised by one partner outweigh the losses of the other partner, who then becomes a 'tied mover '. 3 Although the model generates a number of testable hypotheses and explicitly takes into account the specific locational coordination problems that arise due to the presence of a partner, it has been criticised for its restrictive assumptions (for a critique, see Kalter, 1998;Ott, 1989). Despite the apparent asymmetry of mobility consequences between partners, Mincer still assumes that migration decisions are made collectively and consensually by the household, ignoring the possibility of conflict and the role of individual interests in the decision process.…”

Section: Mobility Of Couplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A simple mobility game for couples’ migration decisions and some quasi-experimental evidence

Abraham

Nisic

2012

Rationality and Society

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This paper develops a new theoretical model for couples’ migration decisions, called the mobility game. The model describes migration decisions as reliant on the strategic interdependence of two partners. The important implications of this model are as follows: first, under complete information, a household move is the ‘natural’ solution for stable couples; second, incomplete information allows the tied mover to ‘blackmail’ the partner and thus to avoid the household move; and third, the decision to commute will depend mostly on the preferences of the potential commuter. The hypotheses derived from this theoretical framework are empirically testable, although the necessary information is difficult to measure. The hypotheses are tested employing a quasi-experimental design known as factorial survey, which allows one to vary systematically the incentives for moving. The empirical results confirm the importance of both strategic reasoning and mechanisms for solving problems of cooperation within the partnership.

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“…Ein Argument basiert auf der Annahme, dass die Traditionalisierung der Arbeitsteilung für die Frau risikoreich ist, da ihr erwerbsspezifisches humankapital einer Entwer tungsgefahr unterliegt (Ott 1989(Ott , 1992Ziefle 2004). dieses Risiko kann durch die Eheschließung besser kompensiert werden als durch eine nichteheliche Lebensgemein schaft.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Arbeitsteilung, Berufsorientierung und Partnerschaftsstabilität – Ehen und nichteheliche Lebensgemeinschaften im Vergleich*

Lois

2008

Koelner Z.Soziol.u.Soz.Psychol

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Zusammenfassung: Das zentrale Ergebnis der Arbeit ist, dass sich Ehen und nicht eheliche Lebensgemeinschaften im Hinblick auf den Zusammenhang zwischen der außerhäuslichen Arbeitsteilung und der Partnerschaftsstabilität unterscheiden. Ehen werden durch die Erwerbsbeteiligung der Frau destabilisiert und durch eine traditio nelle Arbeitsteilung stabilisiert. Empirisch äußert sich dies in einem positiven Effekt des Einkommens bzw. der Berufsorientierung der Frau und einem negativen Effekt des relativen Einkommens des Mannes auf die Trennungswahrscheinlichkeit. Nichteheliche Lebensgemeinschaften werden dagegen durch eine egalitäre Arbeitsteilung stabilisiert. Es lässt sich kein negativer Effekt der Erwerbsbeteiligung der Frau auf die Stabili tät nachweisen. Das relative Einkommen des Mannes erhöht zudem das Risiko einer Auflösung von nichtehelichen Partnerschaften. Unabhängig vom Einkommensverhältnis erweist sich eine Einstellungshomogamie der Partner als erklärungskräftig. Die nicht eheliche Partnerschaft wird stabilisiert, wenn beide Partner beruflichen Erfolg anstre ben. Dieses Ergebnis deutet nicht nur auf eine egalitäre Geschlechtsrollenorientierung unverheirateter Männer hin. Es ist zudem ein Hinweis darauf, dass eine egalitäre Aus richtung der Partnerschaft Konsequenzen für die Lebensgestaltung hat, die von beiden Partnern akzeptiert werden müssen -zum Beispiel im Hinblick auf die Familienplanung oder das Timing der Eheschließung.Abstract: The central finding of this paper is that the link between the division of la bour and the risk of separation differs depending on the type of relationship. Marriages tend to be destabilised by the wife's participation in the labour force and stabilised by the traditional division of labour. Empirical evidence of this is manifest in a positive effect of the wife's income and a negative effect of the husband's relative income on the likelihood of separation. In contrast to this, unmarried longterm relationships are stabilised by egalitarian division of labour. This is evident from the absence of negative effects of an employment of the female cohabiter on stability of relationship. Further more, in unmarried cohabitations the relative income of the man increases the risk of a separation. In addition to the income ratio, homogamous attitudes have explanatory value. Cohabitations are stable when both partners are career-oriented. This finding points to an egalitarian genderroleorientation among unmarried men. It also implies that an egalitarian orientation has an impact on the living arrangement which needs to be accepted by both partners -for instance when family planning and timing of mar riage are concerned.

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Familienbildung und familiale Entscheidungsfindung aus verhandlungstheoretischer Sicht

Cited by 39 publications

References 5 publications

Couples' fertility decision-making

Couples' fertility decision-making

A simple mobility game for couples’ migration decisions and some quasi-experimental evidence

Arbeitsteilung, Berufsorientierung und Partnerschaftsstabilität – Ehen und nichteheliche Lebensgemeinschaften im Vergleich*

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