2010
DOI: 10.1177/0894486510365508
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Family Ownership and Firm Performance in Chile: A Note on Martinez et al.'s Evidence

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Cited by 19 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Additionally, Bonilla, Sepulveda, and Carvajal [64] in Chile, and Wenyi [65] in Taiwan, find that family participation on the board leads to better performance and lower volatility in returns.…”
Section: Board Structurementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Additionally, Bonilla, Sepulveda, and Carvajal [64] in Chile, and Wenyi [65] in Taiwan, find that family participation on the board leads to better performance and lower volatility in returns.…”
Section: Board Structurementioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the seeking and embarking on new ventures is not done blindly and recklessly. Family firms operate conservatively and are risk aversive compared to nonfamily firms (Bonilla et al, 2010). Second-generation family owners often become risk averse in an attempt to preserve the family wealth (Molly et al, 2010).…”
Section: Entrepreneurial Spiritmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Following the previous studies(Hubbard, 2009;García-Sánchez & García-Meca, 2017), we use the multidimensional construct in order to measure CSR performance.2 The multidimensional construct consists of three indices(environmental, social and ethical).3 We manually gather information about 21 items from the annual reports of 190 companies for the period of 2007-2016 from companies' websites.The value of these 21 items ranged from 0 to 100. Afterwards, we repeat this process the previous studies, family-controlled business (FCB) is measured as a dummy variable, and is coded 1 if most of the family members are present on the company's board of directors; otherwise it is coded zero(Cascino, Pugliese, Mussolino, & Sansone, 2010;Bonilla, Sepulveda, & Carvajal, 2010; Prencipe & Bar-Yosef, choice of control variables generally followsBiddle and Hilary (2006),Biddle et al (2009) andGomariz and Ballesta (2014). Afterwards, we repeat this process the previous studies, family-controlled business (FCB) is measured as a dummy variable, and is coded 1 if most of the family members are present on the company's board of directors; otherwise it is coded zero(Cascino, Pugliese, Mussolino, & Sansone, 2010;Bonilla, Sepulveda, & Carvajal, 2010; Prencipe & Bar-Yosef, choice of control variables generally followsBiddle and Hilary (2006),Biddle et al (2009) andGomariz and Ballesta (2014).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%