Federal Arrangements and the Provision of Public Goods in India

Chhibber, Pradeep; Shastri, Sandeep; Sisson, Richard D.

doi:10.1525/as.2004.44.3.339

Cited by 49 publications

(27 citation statements)

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“…On the other hand, Khemani (2001) looking at both national and state elections, finds evidence that voters reward (punish) governments for good (poor) economic performance, but do so more vigilantly at the state versus the national level. This result is consistent with recent survey evidence, which indicates voters look primarily to state governments for provision of many important public goods (Chhibber, Shastri and Sisson, 2004).…”

Section: Holding Together -Fiscal Federalismsupporting

confidence: 91%

Holding India Together: The Role of Institutions of Federalism

Singh

2017

SSRN Journal

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India is a large, heterogeneous and complex nation, with multiple languages, religions and ethnicities, and over one billion people. It stands out in having held together while sustaining a working democracy for over five decades, at relatively low levels of income. One of the main institutional aspects of managing heterogeneity to preserve national unity is the structures of Indian federalism. This paper traces some of the features of Indian federal institutions, focusing on their contribution to this 'holding together.' It reviews the conceptual and analytical underpinnings of the role of federal structures in sustaining unity, and summarizes historical developments and current institutional structures of the Indian case. It assesses the role of federal dimensions of political, administrative and judicial structures in the holding together function. It also examines fiscal federal institutions and their impacts, including distributional and growth issues. It also separately focuses specifically on the special treatment of what may be characterized as India's periphery.JEL codes: P26, P35, H1, H7

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Section: Holding Together -Fiscal Federalismsupporting

confidence: 91%

Holding India Together: The Role of Institutions of Federalism

Singh

2017

SSRN Journal

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Section: 4supporting

confidence: 82%

Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization in India

Singh

2007

SSRN Journal

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This paper surveys the state of fiscal federalism in India, in the broader context of decentralization. We begin with an overview of the basic features and recent developments in intergovernmental fiscal relations, including the role of political institutions, the specifics of legislative and budgetary autonomy, assignments of expenditure responsibility and revenue authority, revenue collection mechanisms, the system of intergovernmental transfers, and institutions and mechanisms for borrowing by subnational units. We then provide a diagnosis of accountability mechanisms, examining their quality of functioning and distortions and constraints. In particular, we analyze to what extent, and through what mechanisms, lower-level governments are held accountable to higher-level governments, the extent to which policies of subnational governments are affected by the competition for mobile firms, taxpayers, and investment capital, the functioning of credit markets, including the responsiveness of subnational governments to credit ratings and bond yields, and the role of democratic electoral channels at national and subnational levels in providing accountability in the provision of subnational public goods. Next, we review the implications of the intergovernmental system and accountability mechanisms on the cooperation of subnational governments and the quality of service delivery. We examine the resources and capacity of the subnational entities that are responsible for key services such as water, sanitation, education and health care, and the impacts of decentralization on service quality and the distribution of benefits among elected officials, citizens and interest groups. Finally, we offer a concluding assessment with suggestions for reform priorities.JEL codes: P26, P35, H1, H7

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“…Also, Rao and Singh (2005) and Kapur and Mehta (2006) have argued that large payments were directed by the center in the late 1990s to the states of origin (Andhra Pradesh and Punjab) of regional parties that were key central coalition partners. 23 This result is consistent with survey evidence that voters look mainly to state governments for provision of many public goods (Chhibber, Shastri and Sisson, 2004).…”

supporting

confidence: 67%

Reforming India’s Institutions of Public Expenditure Governance

Singh¹

2017

Rethinking Public Institutions in India

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractThe poor quality and effectiveness of much of government expenditure in India makes it important to analyze ways of improving effectiveness through institutional reform. Improvements in outcomes include better targeting of redistributive measures and more efficient spending on productive projects. Four potential areas of institutional reform are: (1) improved functioning of individual ministries and departments, at the central and state levels; (2) better coordination across individual ministries and between the center and states, through reform of the Planning Commission; (3) reassignment of expenditure responsibilities across levels of government (center to state and/or state to local); and (4) reassignment of tax authorities to provide improved incentives for expenditure governance through electoral accountability. The paper will discuss each of these four areas of potential institutional reforms, their likely impacts, and possibilities for implementing change.

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Federal Arrangements and the Provision of Public Goods in India

Cited by 49 publications

References 0 publications

Holding India Together: The Role of Institutions of Federalism

Holding India Together: The Role of Institutions of Federalism

Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization in India

Reforming India’s Institutions of Public Expenditure Governance

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